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Gender and sexual variance invite a cornucopia of philosophically 
salient inquiries. My dissertation considers them in the realm of 
bioethics. Bioethics can be defined as a field of philosophy that 
interrogates ethical, societal, and political questions emerging from 
the development of medicine and biosciences. In my dissertation, I 
discuss how queer feminist interrogations of key bioethical concepts, 
such as autonomy and justice, can enrich bioethical theory, 
methodology, and practice.  
A prominent view, both in bioethical research and in the ethical 
evaluation of medical practices, systems, and policies, is the so-
called principlist approach. This has two subfields: the view that 
principles are grounded in moral theory, and the view that they are 
based on a common morality. In my dissertation, I offer a critique of 
both views. In both cases, however, principles are thought to abstract 
morally salient elements that should guide bioethical analyses. The 
most prominent principles are, in nonhierarchical order: respect for 
autonomy; nonmaleficence (not to cause harm); beneficence (to 
provide benefits, and to balance benefits against risks); and justice 
(as the fair distribution of benefits and risks—in my view an 
insufficient definition of justice).  
In my dissertation, I discuss how cis- and heteronormativity can 
affect bioethical analyses, including the definition and application of 
principles. Cis- and heteronormativity refers to the categorization of 
gender and sexual variance through the binaries of male/female and 
homo/hetero, which are constructed hierarchically. My work is 
informed by the theoretical backdrops of feminist philosophy, 
feminist bioethics, and queer bioethics. I conclude that gender and 
sexual variance should replace cis- and heteronormativity in 
bioethical analyses, including principlist approaches. 
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My dissertation consists of four articles and an introduction. The 
introduction contextualizes, bridges, evaluates, and further develops 
the argumentation presented in the articles. In article I, “Considering 
Unicorns: Queer Bioethics and Intersectionality” (Sudenkaarne 
2018a), I discuss queer bioethics via concept analysis in relation to 
intersectionality, the prominent notion that there are several 
overlapping axes of oppression. This philosophical discussion 
reveals some persistent issues that I call the problem of identity, the 
problem of relativism, and the problem of essentialism, which are 
also framed by my inquiry in the introduction. In article II, 
“Queering Bioethics: A Queer Bioethics Inventory of Surrogacy” 
(Sudenkaarne 2018b), I offer a queer bioethical analysis of ethical 
guidelines for surrogacy treatment, applying the queer bioethical 
methodology known as the queer bioethics inventory (QBI). I find 
these ethical guidelines to include cis- and heteronormativity. In 
article III, “Queering Vulnerability: A Layered Bioethical Approach” 
(Sudenkaarne 2019), I offer a unique contribution to queer and 
feminist bioethical theory and methodology by building on the 
central concepts of QBI and the feminist theory of layered 
vulnerability to formulate what I call queer vulnerabilities, targeting 
kinship, intimacy, agency, and ethical sustainability. In article IV, 
“Queering Medicalized Gender Variance” (Sudenkaarne 2020b), I 
apply my theory and methodology of queer vulnerabilities to 
diagnostics of gender variance in the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, currently in their 11th and fifth versions 
respectively. I conclude that despite progress from the previous 
versions, both are in need of further queer bioethical scrutiny and 
operate with a confused metaphysics of gender.  
Ultimately, I conclude that gender and sexual variance as a norm in 
the framework for principlist analyses is needed to guarantee the 
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fulfillment of principles, including in LGBTQI+ cases. For this 
reason, my dissertation aims to offer a queer feminist framework for 
principles. Further, I seek to formulate queer bioethics as a 
posthuman moral theory to further enhance a queer feminist 
approach to bioethics, ethics, and philosophy. Such an approach 
should be better attuned to intersectionality, and should seek to 
resolve the imbalance between reproductive rights, reproductive 
justice, and ecojustice on a global scale.  
KEYWORDS: Ethics; Feminist Philosophy; Queer Bioethics; 
Feminist Bioethics; Bioethical Principles; Principlism; LGBTQI+; 




Sukupuolen ja seksuaalisuuden moninaisuus nostaa esiin filosofisesti 
merkityksellisiä kysymyksiä. Väitöstutkimukseni tarkastelee suku-
puolen ja seksuaalisuuden moninaisuuden bioetiikkaa. Bioetiikka 
tutkii ja selvittää moraalis-yhteiskunnallisia kysymyksiä jotka 
nousevat erityisesti lääke- ja biotieteen kehityksestä ja joilla on myös 
valtasuhteisiin liittyviä ulottuvuuksia. Tarkastelen, miten kriittiset 
feministiset ja queer-näkökulmat bioetiikan peruskäsitteisiin, kuten 
autonomiaan ja oikeudenmukaisuuteen, voivat rikastuttaa bioetiikan 
teoriaa, metodologiaa ja käytäntöä.  
Keskeinen bioetiikan suuntaus on periaatteisiin nojaava 
lähestymistapa. Periaatteiden ajatellaan yhtäältä nousevan 
moraaliteorioista, toisaalta nojaavaan niin kutsuttuun yleiseen 
moraalikäsitykseen. Tarkastelen kriittisesti molempia käsityksiä. 
Molemmissa käsityksissä ydinajatus kuitenkin on, että periaatteiden 
kautta tavoitetaan moraalisesti merkittäviä elementtejä, jotka 
ohjaavat bioeettistä analyysiä. Tunnetuimpia periaatteita ovat 
autonomian kunnioittaminen, hyvän tekeminen, pahan välttäminen ja 
oikeudenmukaisuus (joka usein määritellään nähdäkseni keskeisen 
riittämättömästi riskien ja hyötyjen reiluksi jakaantumiseksi).  
Väitöstutkimuksessani tarkastelen, miten cis- ja heteronormativiisuus 
voi vaikuttaa bioeettiseen analyysiin, mukaan lukien periaatteiden 
määrittymiseen ja toteutumiseen. Cis- ja heteronormatiivisuudella 
tarkoitan vaadetta sukupuolen ja seksuaalisuuden mukauttamisesta 
mies-nainen- ja homo-hetero –kategorioihin, jotka rakentuvat hier-
arkkisesti. Tutkimukseni ankkuroituu keskeisimmin feministisen 
filosofian, feministisen bioetiikan ja queer-bioetiikan teoria-
konteksteihin. Totean, että sukupuolen ja seksuaalisuuden moninai-
suuden tulisi korvata cis- ja heterornormi bioeettisissä analyyseissä, 
myös periaatteita käytettäessä.  
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Väitöstutkimukseni koostuu neljästä englanninkielisestä artikkelista 
ja johdanto-osiosta. Johdannossa kontekstualisoin artikkeleissa esit-
tämiäni ajatuksia, tarkastelen niiden välisiä yhteyksiä sekä arvioin ja 
jatkokehittelen argumentaatiota. Artikkelissa I “Considering 
Unicorns: Queer Bioethics and Intersectionality” (Sudenkaarne 
2018a) tarkastelen käsiteanalyyttisesti queer-bioetiikan rakentumista 
ja sen suhdetta intersektionaalisuuden teoriaan, useiden saman-
aikaisten syrjinnälle altistavien akseleiden läsnäoloon. Tästä tarkas-
telusta nousevat myös identiteettiin, essentialismiin ja relativismiin 
liittyvät pohdinnat, jotka kytkevät problematiikan yleisfilosofisen 
tarkasteluun. Artikkelissa II “Queering Bioethics: A Queer Biothics 
Inventory of Surrogacy” (Sudenkaarne 2018b) siirryn soveltamaan 
queer-bioetiikkaa sijaissynnyttämisen bioeettisessä keskustelussa. 
Metodologisina työkaluina käytän käsiteanalyysiä ja queer-
bioeettistä kysymyslistaa (Queer Bioethics Inventory). Analyysini 
tuloksena esitän, että cis- ja heteronormatiivisuus saattaa vääristää 
bioeettistä arviointia.  
Artikkelissa III ”Queering Vulnerability: A Layered Bioethical 
Approach” (Sudenkaarne 2019) kehitän queer-bioetiikan teoriaa ja 
metodologiaa edelleen yhdistämällä queer-bioeettisen kysymyslistan 
nähdäkseni keskeiset elementit feministisen bioetiikan 
kerrokselliseen haavoittuvuuden teoriaan ja muotoilen näin 
kiintymykseen, intiimiyteen, toimijuuteen ja eettiseen kestävyyteen 
kytkeytyvät queer-haavoittuvuuden kerrokset. Artikkelissa IV 
”Queering Medicalized Gender Variance” (Sudenkaarne 2020b), 
sovellan queer-haavoittuvuuden kerroksia sukupuolen moni-
naisuuden diagnostiikan käsite- ja queer-bioeettisessä analyysissä 
ICD-11 ja DSM-V tautiluokituksissa. Totean, että vaikka 
parannuksia edellisiin versioihin on tehty, ovat molemmat luo-
kitukset laajemman queer-bioeettisen reformin tarpeessa ja nojaavat 
epämääräisille metafyysisille käsityksille sukupuolesta.  
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Laajemmin totean, että sukupuolen ja seksuaalisuuden moni-
naisuuden normi tulee sisältyä periaatteita ohjaavaan kehyksen, sillä 
siten turvataan parhaiten periaatteiden toteutuminen myös 
LHBTQI+-tapauksissa. Väitöstutkimuksessani pyrinkin muotoile-
maan queer-feministisen kehyksen periaatteelliselle lähestymis-
tavalle. Lisäksi hahmottelen queer-bioetiikasta posthumanistista mo-
raaliteoriaa queer-feministisenä kontribuutiona bioetiikkaan, laa-
jemmin etiikantutkimukseen ja filosofiaan. Queer-bioetiikan moraa-
liteoriana tulisi nähdäkseni vastata paremmin intersektionalisuuden 
haasteisiin sekä pyrkiä ratkomaan lisääntymisoikeuksien, lisään-
tymisoikeudenmukaisuuden ja eko-oikeudenmukaisuuden välisiä 
ristiriitoja globaalissa mittakaavassa.  
AVAINSANAT: Etiikka; feministinen filosofia; feministinen bio-
etiikka; queer-bioetiikka; bioetiikka; periaatteet; LGBTQI+; lisään-




I have had the pleasure of completing this dissertation as a grant 
researcher on the project Technology, Ethics, and Reproduction: 
Controversy in the Era of Normalization (ReproEthics) funded by 
Kone Foundation and based at Tampere University. Spearheaded by 
Riikka Homanen, our project takes as its focus the ethics of 
reproductive technologies: an ethical evaluation essential to the 
acceptance of, regulation of, dissemination of, participation in, and 
marketization of reproductive technologies. The project brings 
together methods, perspectives, and scholars from social sciences, 
anthropology, and bioethics to examine ethics. It explores a wide 
variety of cases of technological practice that have, or may in future, 
become normalized as uncontroversial in some (delimited) cultural 
contexts.  
In terms of LGBTQI+ reproduction, the Nordic region, if not the 
global North, has experienced something of a queer baby boom 
during the new millennium. Following the recognition of varieties of 
same-sex or gender-neutral marriage and civil partnership by many 
states, coupled with advances in assisted reproduction technologies 
available on a global and stratified market, family law has been 
expanded to include same-sex parental constellations. Same-sex 
couples, along with “solo persons with wombs,” now have growing 
access to assisted reproduction via the state (Dahl and Björklund 
2020, 7). At the same time, infertility as a requirement for gender 
affirmation has been lifted in many countries—although Finland is 
not one of them1—and policymakers and lawmakers are busy 
 
1 The Finnish legislation currently mandates that the person seeking to obtain the 
“opposite” legal gender status must have medical proof of infertility. In many 
cases, this mandate is met through hormone therapy as part of the treatment for 
the transgender person’s gender incongruence. However, not all transgender 
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pondering how to expand heteronormative frameworks to 
accommodate trans parents whose reproductive biology is not 
congruent with how the terms mother and father are understood. All 
this and more means that nowadays, fertile generations of LGBTQI+ 
people have reproductive futures and are able to make kin in both 
nuclear and queer family forms (ibid.). My contribution focuses on 
discussing how such LGBTQI+ issues can reveal interruptions in 
ethical sense-making, of which the gravity and ramifications for 
queer lives require not only changes in practice but also queer and 
feminist reconfigurations of bioethical theory. This dissertation aims 
to throw some of these issues into relief.  
I am delighted to have found both material and intellectual resources 
for my work, although neither has been an uncomplicated endeavor. 
I have had opportunities presented to me, which I greatly appreciate; 
but for the most part, I have fought for them. Despite the constant 
praise for multidisciplinary research, such research more often 
receives lip service than funding. Inquiries into the ethics of gender, 
sexuality, and race/ethnicity continue to be considered marginal, and 
to be rendered troubling by some. The tumultuous, even toilsome 
periods of working toward my PhD have galvanized me. One of my 
key realizations is the moral gravitas of the everyday: the seemingly 
mundane actions, encounters, and words that craft ethical worlds, for 
better or worse. It is the duty of all of us who claim membership in 
the academic community to strive for a better world, to fight 
injustice—from safe funding choices to obvious discrimination. 
 
people would choose hormone therapy, and most definitely not all transgender 
people wish to become infertile. Most crucially, the notion of mandating 
infertility for a group of people is connected to the history of eugenics and its 
sterilization practices (Honkasalo 2018, 2019), a vast, silenced legacy that 
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Gender and sexual diversity—the fluidity of identities, embodiments, 
and desires exceeding the binaries of both male/female and 
homo/hetero—has been established as a human rights issue. Topics 
that once were considered societally marginal and of interest only to 
connoisseurs of medical curiosities have emerged into public debate: 
the removal of homosexuality from mental disorder classifications, 
transgender rights, the bodily integrity of people defined as intersex, 
and reproductive technologies for queer people, to mention a few 
examples from the 1960s to date. The activism of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and other people invested in 
gender and sexual diversity (LGBTQI+) has been a crucial catalyst 
for these achievements (Drescher 2010, 434; Wahlert and Fiester 
2014; Nelson 1998, 2012). I use the terms queer and LGBTQI+ 
overlappingly, although it is crucial to note that there are also 
tensions between all these positions.  
My dissertation discusses the philosophy of gender and sexual 
variance from a queer feminist2 point of view, focusing on the field 
of bioethics. In my treatment, bioethics refers to the inquiry into 
ethical issues in medicine and life sciences. It also refers to a 
philosophical understanding of medical ethics, as opposed to, for 
example, administrative or consulting approaches. The term 
biomedical ethics, then, narrows down the scope of inquiry to 
emphasize medical ethics as it is practiced in medical encounters, 
systems, and policies, and also as professional ethics in health care. 
Hence, all three terms (bioethics, medical ethics, and biomedical 
ethics) are overlapping; but in my view, bioethics is the 
 
2 By queer feminist, I refer to a framework combining queer and feminist 
approaches. However, this framework is not to be read as a conflation, and this 
this combination of approaches is not ubiquitous.   
 
3 
philosophically most rewarding level of inquiry, as it is the most 
attuned to moral-theoretical contemplation. Perhaps it is also worth 
making a distinction between bioethics as a field of academic inquiry 
and the bioethics of medical and health care practices, systems, and 
policies, which includes but is not limited to the ethical guidelines 
and professional ethics of health care providers. I am mostly 
concerned with the embodied and moral ramifications of the latter. 
From this viewpoint, bioethics can be defined as considerations of 
the moral, societal, and political issues brought about by sickness, 
health, care, embodiment, technology, and environment (cf. Häyry 
2014). Ethics is a generic term covering several different ways of 
understanding and examining moral life, some normative and others 
nonnormative. Nonnormativity refers to approaches that wish to 
establish “what factually or conceptually is the case, not what 
ethically ought to be the case or what is ethically valuable” 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 1–2). A prominent bioethical view 
is the so-called four principles approach, which originated in 1979 
with Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
currently in its the seventh edition. Despite the prominence of 
principlism, especially outside the realm of bioethics as academic 
inquiry, there are also approaches that do not build on it, such as 
casuistry, the ethics of care, and virtue ethics. However, these 
approaches often also refer to principles in one way or another (Arras 
1991, 2016; Gilligan 1982; Held 2005). Principlism has generated 
extensive discussion among—and between—academic 
commentators and practicing health care professionals (Huxtable 
2013, 39; Takala 2001; Donchin 2001; Harris 2003; Macklin 2003; 
Lindemann 2007; Fiester 2015). The four principles formulated by 
Beauchamp and Childress are, in nonhierarchical order: respect for 
autonomy (the obligation to respect the decision-making capacities 
of autonomous persons); nonmaleficence (the obligation to avoid 
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causing harm); beneficence (the obligations to provide benefits and 
balance benefits against risks); and justice (obligations of fairness in 
the distribution of benefits and risks) (Huxtable 2013, 39). For 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 2–3), these four principles are 
based on a “common morality,” which is something “shared by all 
persons committed to morality.” In their view, these principles are 
not arrived at from moral theory; they are careful to differentiate 
between moral theory and framework. Their principlism is intended 
as a framework. Yet the differentiation between moral theory and 
framework, as will be discussed later in more detail, can be seen to 
cause confusion and to inadequately guide the use of principles. 
Further, a third issue, to be properly addressed later, is that an 
undefined framework can pave the way for moral harms (Fiester 
2015; Takala 2001; Donchin and Purdy 2001). Suffice it to say for 
now that some forms of principlism relate to moral theory 
derivatively, whereas others, such as Beauchamp and Childress’s, do 
so nonderivatively (Ashcroft et al. 2007; Takala 2001).  
In principlism that promotes abstract principles, these are often 
specified and balanced with rules or norms in a process of reflective 
equilibrium (RE), also referred to as the method of RE. In this 
process, the deliberator moves back and forth between various moral 
beliefs, judgments, and principles in pursuit of coherence. An 
extension to RE, wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) also takes 
background theories into account (Huxtable 2013, 39; Arras 2007; 
Mühlebach 2016; Longino 2010; Haslanger 1999). Hence, according 
to their promoters, the principles provide a framework for identifying 
and reflecting on moral problems, but not a guiding theory of 
morality. According to critics, the framework not only advances a 
distinctively Western (Anglo-American) position but also fails to 
recognize the multiplicity of traditions and perspectives that exist 
even within the societies it purports to reflect, for example the 
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positions of women, racialized people, or LGBTQI+ people 
(Huxtable 2013, 40; Lindemann 2007; Donchin 2001; Wahlert and 
Fiester 2014; Fiester 2015; Takala 2001; Cowley 2005). Even if 
there is room to disagree about the imperialist nature of the 
principles, it can be argued that in many situations they will therefore 
be inapplicable. Further to these critics, particular problems arise 
when the principles encounter patients who lack autonomy, such as 
racialized women and queer people in many contexts; this either 
renders their claims unintelligible or infringes the principle in 
question—for example, the principle of balancing nonmaleficence 
and beneficence when one is deciding on hormone therapy for an 
adolescent transgender patient based on cis- and heteronormativity 
(Donchin 2001; Sudenkaarne 2018b). Yet another complaint is that 
despite Beauchamp and Childress’s nonhierarchical ordering of 
principles, autonomy often becomes emphasized over the others; for 
critics, this runs the risk of disenfranchising those who would 
prioritize alternative principles (or approaches), as well as 
discounting those considered nonautonomous (Huxtable 2013; 
Donchin 2001). On the confused relation to moral theory, it has been 
argued that the four-principles approach is in fact developed as a 
common-morality theory built on “American common morality,” i.e. 
emphasizing only the sides of moral life that are prominent in the 
dominant culture of the US, leading to an underdevelopment of 
beneficence and justice; further, it has also been argued that methods 
offered for the specification and balancing of principles, such as RE, 
are inadequate (Holm 1995; Lindemann 2007; Donchin 2001; ten 
Have 2016). The principles can also be perceived to be inconsistent 
among themselves, creating ethical dilemmas such as how to balance 
autonomy with justice (Huxtable 2013, 41). 
In my view, the most important critique against principlism is that it 
is an inadequate moral framework for bioethical analysis. Even 
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though the method of RE can bridge ethical sense-making from 
abstract principles to complex situations, in my view adherence to 
certain moral norms, such as gender and sexual variance as 
embedded in human rights, requires a more profound commitment 
than a methodological consideration or a call for consensus. WRE 
can be useful for revealing the moral content of a framework, and it 
can be used for queer feminist, intersectional analysis, but it does not 
per se constitute a queer feminist intersectional framework, which I 
suggest is needed to enrich bioethical theory. At its worst, without 
the weight of supplementary approaches, principlism is in danger of 
becoming a clinical and academic checklist, a hollow exercise with 
little to do with ethical imagination or moral salience: unable to tell 
us anything new, incapable of detecting errors, and prone to create 
inconsistent arguments and encourage a perfunctory approach to the 
mechanical performance of ethics (Huxtable 2013, 41; Takala 2001; 
Harris 2003; Cowley 2005). It can also be deployed against marginal 
groups and people rendered vulnerable (Donchin 2001; Holmes 
1999; Fiester 2015; Sudenkaarne 2018b).  
In this introduction, I aim to offer a principlist approach informed by 
a queer feminist framework, grounding further advances for a queer 
feminist, posthuman moral theory. I also intended this framework to 
be built as intersectional, although the majority of that work is to be 
completed in future projects. Due to the debated centrality of 
autonomy in principlist accounts, and its correlations with key 
critiques presented in feminist philosophy, in this introduction I offer 
an example of the reconfiguration of autonomy with a queer feminist 
framework. However, the concept of justice is also central 
throughout my work. The disproportion between the interest in 
autonomy and the lack of interest in justice reverberates in feminist 




To situate my treatment within the fields of philosophy, I draw from 
analytical philosophy and ethics. I have both normative and 
nonnormative aims for my work. On one hand, I deploy analyses that 
draw from cases to better represent the lives of LGBTQI+ people and 
their encounters with medical practices, systems, and policies. On 
the other, I wish to make normative claims for the bioethics of 
gender and sexual diversity.  
A third field of philosophy that is pivotal to my treatment is feminist 
philosophy. This is a cornucopia of approaches and would more 
adequately be referred to in the plural. However, a crucial shared 
notion is the rejection of traditional Cartesian understandings that 
consider the mind as essentially distinct from the body, with 
rationality strictly associated with the former. Further, following the 
seminal work of Genevieve Lloyd (1984) on gendered reason in the 
history of Western philosophy, feminist philosophers have insisted 
on reconfiguring autonomy via embodied knowledge. This move has 
given rise to two crucial notions: firstly, that knowledge and knowers 
are to be understood as situated in specific times and places; 
secondly, that the knowing subject and the object of knowledge are 
not to be conceived as essentially distinct. Therefore, sense-making 
is not understood in terms of “transcending bodily entanglements 
such as emotion or empathy.” Thirdly, knowers are understood to be 
in various relations of interdependence. This amounts to an 
understanding of knowledge and knowers as situated (Haraway 
1988; Longino 1999, 331–344). The concept of situatedness and the 
embodiment and relationality of autonomy have heavily influenced 
bioethics, to its improvement (e.g. Hoffmaster 2009, 1–2). Indeed, 
one of my work’s general aims is to show how bioethical theory and 
practice can benefit from a queer feminist framework.  
In addition to general philosophical contributions, feminist 
philosophies have obviously rigorously examined the specific 
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construction and ramifications of gender and sexuality. Even though 
many feminist approaches dispute the binary understanding of 
gender, queer theory—which for many is grounded in Judith Butler’s 
postmodern feminist classic Gender Trouble (1991)—has further 
developed multidisciplinary inquiry into nonbinary gender and 
sexuality. Queer theory also overlaps with lesbian and gay studies 
and transgender studies, including juxtapositions within these fields 
(see e.g. Björklund & Dahl 2020; Stryker & Whittle 2006).3 For 
some scholars, queer emerged and continues to point out exclusions 
of nonbinary and racialized agency (e.g. Heyes 2003, 1093; 
Kähkönen & Sudenkaarne 2018; Leibetseder 2018). Intersectional 
critique of both feminist and queer bioethics, to better encompass 
racialized LGBTQI+ people’s lives in both bioethical theory and 
practice, is also included in my work.  
I use queer and LGBTQI+ as umbrella terms for gender and sexual 
variance. In discussions pertaining to a specific ethical issue—for 
example, International Statistical Classification of Diseases 11th 
edition (ICD-11) guidelines for so-called transition treatments for 
people previously referred to as transsexual—the scope of gender 
and sexual diversity is narrowed down to encompass those specifics. 
Even though both LGBTQI+ and queer can be used ethically 
sustainably as umbrella terms in my view, it is crucial to constantly 
bear in mind firstly that tensions exist within these groups of people, 
and secondly that vulnerabilities are further accumulated based on 
intersectional elements, such as race/ethnicity, health care access, or 
employment. For example, nonbinary trans people report more 
difficulties in accessing treatment than binary trans people whose 
“transitioning desires” compute more easily with the current binary 
 
3 Even though transgender and queer interests can be seen to overlap in inquiries 
such as queer bioethics, there can also be tensions between queer and trans 
positions (cf. e.g. Bettcher 2019).  
 
9 
understanding of sex/gender in medical ethics (McKinnon 2018; 
Davy 2015). The diversity of trans people is best described by using 
the term transgender. Similarly to the evolution of queer, it is 
important to note that transgender originates not from medical 
classifications of gender variance, but from activism, associating it 
with self-determination, empowerment, and queer agency rather than 
with medicalization or pathologization. Transgender is not to be 
confused with transsexual, which was used in previous versions of 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) diagnostic manual ICD but 
removed from the 11th: transsexual was coined by biomedical power 
over the queer subject, whereas transgender has queer, bioethically 
sustainable roots in queer activism (Drescher 2010, 435–436; 
McKinnon 2018; Stryker 2006). For Susan Stryker (2006, 3), 
transgender has established itself as the term of choice, in both 
popular parlance and a variety specialist discourses, for a wide range 
of phenomena that “call attention to the fact that gender as it is lived, 
embodied, experienced, performed, and encountered, is more 
complex and varied than can be accounted for by the currently 
dominant binary sex/gender ideology of Eurocentric modernity.” 
In this introduction, I begin my treatment by abstracting my research 
interests into general philosophical inquiries, and I introduce some 
key concepts to ground my approaches in section two. Section three 
then gives an overview of feminist and bioethical theory, including 
tensions between and critiques of them, but also narrowing down to 
the approaches by which my work is most informed. Section four 
offers my further advances on these theoretical approaches, including 
sketching out queer bioethics as a moral theory. I close with an 
evaluation of my work so far and discuss how it will be advanced in 
future research.  
Overall, I suggest there is a lack of acknowledgment of cis- and 
heteronormativity in bioethical theory, including an insufficient 
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understanding of how it can transmogrify the ethical analysis of 
cases. This lacuna must be filled by the formulation of queer feminist 
frameworks. A framework I suggest is a principlist one, in the sense 
that I call for further interrogation into principles within this 
framework. Analysis within this framework can utilize several 
methodologies, such as layered vulnerability, social determinants of 
health, or WRE. What is crucial is that such analyses must be 
grounded in gender and sexual variance rather than cis- and 
heteronormativity. This is firstly in order to properly analyze the 
fulfillment of principles in LGBTQI+ cases, as queer bioethics 
shows how the analysis can become clouded by cis- and 
heteronormativity. Secondly, gender and sexual variance is ipso 
facto a more accurate description of the human condition and a 
source of great human flourishing. Even though specific LGBTQI+ 
issues and needs could perhaps be met by recalibrating or refocusing 
existing principlism, in my view such work requires normative 
commitment. This is also why WRE is not necessarily enough to 
solve the problem of cis- and heteronormativity on the framework 
level, as WRE does not guarantee the norm of gender and sexual 
variance as a human right. A further leap from framework to theory 
is needed, in my view, to reconceptualize the principles connected to 
very basic concepts in Western philosophy that queer feminist 
critiques have targeted, such as autonomy, justice, and knowledge. If 
the difference between framework and theory is that theory can 
guide the grounding of new principles, queer vulnerabilities could 
perhaps offer this type of grounding. Yet it remains for further 
evaluation how they succeed. What they do succeed in doing is to 
suggest how a queer feminist framework for principles can enrich 
bioethical theory and practice.  
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1.1. On Methodology 
My dissertation consists of four articles. All the articles share the 
methodological approach of concept analysis, informed by 
background theories of queer and LGBTQI+ bioethics, feminist 
bioethics, and bioethical principlism. 
Feminist bioethics is a polyphonic field that looks at biomedical 
issues targeting women, and it gains further momentum from 
feminist critiques of science, medicine, rationality, and agency 
(Donchin 2001; Lindemann 2007; Donchin and Purdy 1999; Holmes 
1999; Luna 2018). Overlapping with but also juxtaposed against 
feminist bioethics, queer and LGBT4 bioethics refer to biomedical 
issues raised by gender and sexual variance, for example challenging 
the definition of homosexuality or transgender as pathologies 
(Wahlert and Fiester 2012, 2014; Nelson 1998, 2012, 2014; Murphy 
2015; McKinnon 2018; Drescher 2015). However, feminist or queer 
and LGBT(QI+) bioethics are not approaches on their own account 
simply because they focus on women or queer people: they all also 
offer unique theoretical and methodological contributions. 
A specific queer bioethical methodology deployed in my work is the 
queer bioethics inventory (QBI) of Lance Wahlert and Autumn 
Fiester (2014). Acknowledging that even the most sympathetic and 
well-intentioned cases that include either LGBTQI+ or queer-related 
content can increase bias about sexuality and gender nonconformity 
in medicine, the inventory helps us to approach such bias 
methodologically (ibid., 62). The inventory is to be used in clinical 
encounters, but also in theoretical, metalevel analyses of bioethical 
case studies. Its set of questions aims “to better scrutinize the 
efficacy, legitimacy and impartiality of cases we use in bioethics” 
 
4 I prefer to use the form LGBTQI+ bioethics, but it should be noted that LGBT 
bioethics predates my formulation and is still frequently used. 
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(ibid.). The inventory is intended for both clinical and theoretical use 
to better attend to the needs of LGBTQI+ parties in the clinic and in 
biosciences, not by merely dwelling on the presence of queer people 
in bioethical cases, but by offering an analysis that builds on gender 
and sexual variance as opposed to cis- and heteronormativity. I 
develop this methodology further by formulating four layers of queer 
vulnerabilities, following Luna’s layered theory of vulnerability. The 
last two articles in this dissertation (Sudenkaarne 2019, 2020b) apply 
layered vulnerability as theory and methodology; the first two 
(Sudenkaarne 2018a, 2018b) ground them.  
Article I, “Considering Unicorns: Queer Bioethics and Intersectionality” 
(Sudenkaarne 2018a), formulates queer bioethics as a critical stance 
for dismantling cis- and heteronormativity in bioethics in dialogue 
with intersectionality—the investigation of and potential for social 
justice-oriented change (May 2015). It discusses the difficulties of 
navigating plurality with solidarity and ethical sobriety in relation to 
the general philosophical concepts of identity, essentialism, and 
relativism. Similarly, article III, “Queering Vulnerability: A Layered 
Bioethical Approach” (Sudenkaarne 2019), takes on the key 
bioethical concept of vulnerability to build a queer feminist 
framework: I apply Florencia Luna’s (2018) layered account of 
vulnerability to formulate queer vulnerabilities, targeting intimacy, 
kinship, agency, and ethical sustainability.  
Article II, “Queering Bioethics: A Queer Bioethical Inventory of 
Surrogacy” (Sudenkaarne 2018b), and article IV, “Queering 
Medicalized Gender” (Sudenkaarne 2020b), are more case-oriented. 
The former offers an analysis of ethical guidelines aimed at 
bioethically sustainable surrogacy practice, which I suggest are 
unsustainable from a queer and feminist bioethical point of view. 
The latter article discusses gender variance in ICD-11 and the fifth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
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(DSM-V), the two most globally dominant medical classifications, 
and offers some queer bioethical improvements for medicalized 
gender variance.  
All the articles in this dissertation offer contributions to the bioethics 
of gender and sexual variance from a queer and feminist point of 
view. This viewpoint boils down to questioning cis- and 
heteronormativity as the foundation for making ethical deliberations 
in bioethical theory and in medical practices, systems, and policies.  
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2. Conceptual and General Philosophical 
Framing 
As is often the case with feminist ethical inquiry (cf. Bergin 2009), 
and to foreground the importance of critical self-reflection within 
feminist theory (Dhamoon 2011, 240), I must confess that my PhD 
project was initially fueled by a personal observation that was too 
intellectually irritating and affective to ignore.  
In July 2016, the WHO announced a change in its diagnostic 
classification, ICD, which aimed to declassify transgender identity as 
a mental disorder (Belluck 2016). Approximately 70% of the world’s 
health expenditures are allocated using ICD for reimbursement and 
resources, so any change in ICD affects millions of patients 
worldwide. As I analyze in the fourth article in the dissertation, the 
latest version, ICD-11, which becomes effective in 2022, now 
features the diagnosis of gender incongruence (HA60) under the 
category of conditions related to sexual health, as opposed to the 
mental health section. Hence, previous diagnostics constructing 
gender variance from the prefix trans—most dubiously, that of 
transsexuality—have been removed. Gender incongruence, as 
described in a newspaper article (Belluck 2016) by Dr. Geoffrey 
Reed of the working group that promoted it, aims to express “a 
discrepancy between a person’s experienced gender identity and 
their body.” Further in the article, Dr. Reed expresses frustration 
about how difficult it was to reach any decisions at all: 
The terminology is difficult because nobody likes anything. 
People have made suggestions that have been all over the map. 
One of the people at one of the meetings said we could call this 
happy unicorns dancing by the edge of the stream and there’d be 
an objection to it. (Ibid., emphasis mine) 
 
15 
My immediate reaction to Dr. Reed’s comment, as both a member of 
the LGBTQI+ community and a PhD candidate aspiring to 
participate in such bioethical debates, was to take offense. It is not 
uncommon for social and ethical change demanded from a 
marginalized position to encounter opposition. Deeming social 
justice demands to be ludicrous, and the demanders to be too 
demanding, are also common microaggression strategies (Freeman & 
Weekes Schroer 2020; Dean et al. 2016).  
Later, however, I revisited my reaction. I realized I had been to 
several meetings like Dr. Reed’s; in activist and nongovernmental 
organization work, the issue of ongoing debate and lack of 
compromise can sometimes be paralyzing, not to mention 
intellectually frustrating and emotionally draining. Surely, the 
comment could stem from bias against the LGBTQI+ community. 
But was there also a more fruitful point to be taken? Could 
something self-critically valuable be found by following the prancing 
unicorn? If you think gay marriage is the ultimate human rights 
question around LGBTQI+, you are lucky enough to have suffered 
very few of the tangible, material, or bodily effects of such politics 
compared for example with trans or intersex people. Would we 
rather deny these differences and privileges by resorting to the 
escapist fantasy of unified happiness, the dancing unicorn?  
In searching for a theoretical way to tackle these questions in my 
own work, I was introduced to intersectionality as a potential tool. 
Like many, I was baffled by the myriad uses, theories, and 
approaches there are under this rubric, some stemming from 
juxtaposing schools of thought. Different approaches to the same 
problems are obviously not questionable by definition, but since my 
own approach was philosophical and aimed for bioethical 
application, some critical, systemic concerns started to emerge. I 
labeled these concerns the problem of identity, the problem of 
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essentialism, and the problem of relativism, although these 
considerations are entangled.  
How to work together respecting lived experiences without 
hypocrisy about unity within any community, for example the 
LGBTQI+ community? How to balance identity politics and shared 
political aims, for example the position of black trans women in 
white feminist theory? How to navigate new materialist approaches 
with social constructivism? By problem of identity in this context, I 
mean the assumption that certain identities go with certain privileges 
and oppressions (Sudenkaarne 2018a; Hill Collins and Bilge 2016; 
May 2015). Does subscribing to such assumptions imply that we are 
similarly adhering to a counterrevolutionary view of identity itself, a 
binary understanding of ourselves? Such connections can easily 
sediment into false causalities that are indifferent to myriad personal 
experiences. How can we simultaneously say identity (or body) 
politics is or should be revolutionary, including when it does not 
have the same level of material effects?  
The problem of essentialism is closely connected but not completely 
reducible to the problem of identity. Essentialist logic is what May 
(2015, 39) refers to as same/different logic. After we acknowledge 
how different we are, what unites us? Moreover, however, 
essentialism—crucially—concerns the debate on intersectionality’s 
departure from its Black feminist origins (cf. e.g. Hill Collins and 
Bilge 2016).  How to do intersectionality without racism and 
exclusion? How to toggle ontological sameness and difference in 
ethics, keeping in mind that we must adhere to solidarity? How are 
we to justify or compare ethical stances, and on what principles 
(such as solidarity) are we to build when they are denied the 
metaphysics of purity, meaning the neat separation of elements into 
distinct categories, which is so symptomatic of Western philosophy?  
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The work of feminist philosophers, especially Latina feminists and 
other feminists of color, has been instrumental in showing the flaws 
of purity-valuing metaphysics. Gloria Anzaldúa (1999) has subverted 
the logic of purity and explored the problem of identity by 
uncovering a mestiza consciousness. This is a hybrid, a new 
personhood: a self that accords with the facts of her own life better 
than the idealized self. She sees that  
the mestizo and the queer exist at this time and point on the 
evolutionary continuum for a purpose. We are a blending that 
proves that all blood is intricately woven together, and that we 
are spawned out of similar souls. (Ibid., 107) 
Maria Lugones (1994) views the concepts of purity and impurity as 
central components of two inconsistent logics. The logic of purity is 
a metaphysical attitude in which every multiple thing can be (or 
ought to be able to be) neatly separated into pure unitaries, as one 
might split an egg into yolk and white. We are seemingly very 
securely situated within our taxonomies (of race or gender, for 
example) and do not like our categories to be messed with; as more 
and more disparate categories are combined, we become more and 
more uneasy. This applies to people, things, and systems alike (see 
also Bergin 2009, 261–265).  
To subvert the logics of purity is also to refuse the separation of the 
metaphysical, the epistemological, and the ethical into distinct 
spheres of inquiry; instead, I suggest we must track down the lived 
harms and wrongs our ontological stances and epistemic habits 
produce, by ethical analysis. However, in light of the problem of 
identity, the problem of essentialism, and the problem of relativism, 
intersectionality seems to be ontologically, epistemologically, and 
ethically dubious. I will next discuss these philosophical issues, 
feminist and queer thought, and bioethical viewpoints. I ultimately 
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suggest that one solution is to build on a reconfigured notion of 
vulnerability. 
2.1. On Intersectionality 
Drawing on black feminist and critical legal theory, Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (1989, 2017) originally developed the concept of 
intersectionality as an academic concept to speak to the multiple 
social forces, social identities, and ideological instruments through 
which power and disadvantage are expressed and legitimized. 
Intersectionality has since been accompanied by feminist 
intersectionality theory, which is not reducible to its origins in black 
feminist thought. It has been suggested that there are power relations 
within contemporary feminist academic debates on intersectionality 
that work to depoliticize intersectionality, neutralizing its critical 
potential for social justice-oriented change. At a time when 
intersectionality has received unprecedented international acclaim 
within feminist academic circles and in public debate, a specifically 
disciplinary academic feminism in tune with the neoliberal 
knowledge economy is engaging in argumentative practices that 
reframe and undermine it. These include confining intersectionality 
to an academic exercise of metatheoretical contemplation, as well as 
“whitening intersectionality” through claims that intersectionality is 
“the brainchild of feminism” and requires a reformulated “broader 
genealogy of intersectionality” (Bilge 2013, 405). 
Building on Crenshaw’s seminal work, Peter Kwan (1997, 1275; also 
Nash 2011, 458) notes something that I find appealing: what is 
distinctive about intersectionality is not so much the recognition of 
multiple identities in specific loci but the separate political claims, 
and this multiplicity calls for separate theoretical consideration 
against the grain of cultural and legal orthodoxy. Such pathways 
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could lead intersectionality to diversity through activism rather than 
representationalism. According to May (2015, 115; Carbin and 
Edenheim 2013), intersectionality aims to challenge the limits of a 
sequential ontology that leads to additive modes of identity and 
inequality and a simplistic identity politics. This suggests that 
intersectionality theory must be critically informed by practice, not 
vice versa—precisely as was the case with the early formulations in 
Crenshaw’s legal work and the activism of the Combahee River 
Collective (1983). Rita Kaur Dhamoon (2011, 233) sees two main 
risks arising from a focus on intersecting identities: the problem of 
essentialism, and the risk that an intersectional-type analysis of 
identities may end up reiterating the very norms it aims to challenge. 
Nash (2011, 461) observes that by treating race and gender as 
coherent, stable axes of domination, both Crenshaw’s and Collins’s 
canonical accounts of intersectionality understate the contingency 
and contextuality of identity—the variety of ways that race and 
gender are experienced differently in distinctive contexts and 
historical moments. Returning to the scene of the accident that is 
identity, Nash offers the critique that when scholars such as 
Crenshaw sought to respond to a doctrinal framework that excluded 
black women, an emphasis on black women’s multiple 
marginalization was used to reveal a doctrinal gap. Yet by insisting 
on black women’s multiple marginalization, the treatment of these 
experiences moved from the descriptive to the symbolic, and was in 
danger of losing the political (ibid.). 
In order to remain political, I promote an intersectional approach that 
is critically informed by the postcolonial ethos. Postcolonial critique 
has its origins in the analysis of literature rather than legal work. It 
has been argued that there is a lot of depth in what postcolonial 
critique teaches us: it sketches out worlds, whereas intersectionality 
aims to create a missing category (Blell, pers. comm., August 26, 
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2020; see also Ilmonen 2011). Although intersectionalist approaches 
vary in ethical rigor and pragmatic applicability, like Sirma Bilge 
(2013; Hill Collins and Bilge 2016) I find the very core of 
intersectionality to be the critical potential for social justice-oriented 
change, and I consider that we must object to its uses by powers-that-
be invested in depoliticizing intersectionality.  
I will next discuss the problem of identity raised by intersectionality 
critique. I offer a queer feminist framework for what Vivian M. May 
(2015, 34) calls an invitation to radical political orientation grounded 
in solidarity (rather than sameness) as a basis for working 
collectively to eradicate inequalities.  
2.2. Problem of Identity 
What I call the problem of identity relates to contemplations in the 
field of philosophy of the self, the study of the many conditions of 
identity that make one subject of experience distinct from other 
experiences, which in the philosophy of mind often overlaps with 
questions of self-knowledge, self-consciousness, and personal 
identity (as in what it is in me that makes me me). The topic of the 
self has long been salient in feminist philosophy, since it is pivotal to 
questions about personal identity, the body, sociality, and agency 
that feminism must address (Anderson et al. 2020). Feminists 
contend that the experiences of the predominantly white, 
heterosexual, and economically advantaged men who have wielded 
social, economic, and political power and dominated the arts, 
literature, media, and scholarship have been taken as universal and 
ideal. As a result, feminists have argued that the self is not only a 
metaphysical issue for philosophy, but also an issue that is ethical, 
epistemological, social, and political. Responding to this state of 
affairs, feminist philosophical work on the self has taken three main 
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tacks: (1) critiques of dominant modern, Western views of the self; 
(2) reclamations of feminine identities; and (3) reconceptualizations 
of the self as (a) a dynamic, relational individual beholden to 
unconscious desires and social bonds and (b) intersectional and even 
heterogeneous. Feminist reconceptualizations of the self have called 
for the recognition of selfhood as a relational, multilayered 
phenomenon (Anderson et al. 2020; cf. Lugones 1994; Anzaldúa 
1999). I will return to these reconceptualizations in the last section of 
this introduction.  
For my inquiry, what can be called the politics of the self or indeed 
identity politics is central. The loaded phrase identity politics has 
come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing 
founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain 
social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, 
programmatic manifestos, or party affiliations, identity-political 
formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific 
constituency that is marginalized within its larger context (Heyes 
2020).  
The second half of the 20th century saw the emergence of large-scale 
political movements—second-wave feminism, the black civil rights 
movement in the US, gay and lesbian liberation, and the American 
Indian movement, for example—based in claims about the injustices 
done to particular social groups. These social movements are 
undergirded by and foster a philosophical body of literature that 
takes up questions about the nature, origin, and futures of the 
identities being defended. Identity politics as a mode of organizing is 
intimately connected to the idea that some social groups are 
oppressed: that is, one’s identity as a woman or a black lesbian in the 
US, for example, makes one peculiarly vulnerable to cultural 
imperialism (including the stereotyping, erasure, or appropriation of 
one’s group identity), violence, exploitation, marginalization, or 
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powerlessness (Young 2006). Identity politics starts from analyses of 
such forms of social injustice to variously recommend the 
reclaiming, redescription, or transformation of previously 
stigmatized accounts of group membership. The scope of political 
movements that may be described as identity politics is broad: the 
examples used in the philosophical literature are predominantly of 
struggles for recognition and social justice by groups of citizens 
within Western capitalist democracies, but Indigenous rights 
movements worldwide, postcolonialist critiques, nationalist projects, 
or demands for regional self-determination use similar arguments 
(Heyes 2020). 
Identity politics signifies a loose collection of political projects, each 
undertaken by representatives of a collective with a distinctively 
different social location that has hitherto been neglected, erased, or 
suppressed. For Heyes (ibid.), what is crucial about the “identity” in 
identity politics appears to be the experience of the subject, 
especially their experience within social structures that generate 
injustice, and the possibility of a shared and more authentic or self-
determined alternative. Thus, identity politics rests on the connection 
between a certain experience and the subject position to which it is 
attributed, and hence on unifying claims about the meaning of 
politically loaded experiences for diverse individuals. Sometimes the 
meaning given to a particular experience will diverge from that of its 
subject. Making sense of such interpretive gaps depends on methods 
that recognize the divergence between dominant epistemic accounts 
and subjugated knowledges. From these understandings of 
subjectivity, it is easy to see why critics of identity politics, and even 
some cautious supporters, have wondered how it can meet the 
challenges of intersectionality (ibid.). For me, it is crucial in meeting 
this challenge to sever ties with harmful modes of essentialism.  
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2.3. Problem of Essentialism 
Simply put, essentialism is the view that it is possible to identify a 
trait, quality, or other defining factor or set of factors—essentia—
shared by all members of a category, and to deem that factor or set of 
factors the most relevant or indeed essential to that category 
(Calhoun 2007, 185). With reference to identity politics, this could 
turn into solidarity actions motivated only by sameness. For 
example, as discussed from the outset of the feminist movement, 
lesbian and racialized feminists have voiced concerns that the 
assumed universal women’s perspective is privileged and partial, 
meaning that it mostly encapsulates white middle-class women’s 
reality. Many leading feminist thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s 
rejected essentialism, particularly on the grounds that universal 
claims about women are invariably false and effectively normalize 
and privilege specific forms of femininity. However, by the 1990s it 
had become apparent that the rejection of essentialism 
problematically undercut feminist politics by denying that women 
had any shared characteristics that could motivate them to act 
together as a collectivity (Stone 2004, 135–136).  
Indeed, the basic problem of essentialism is that it is insensitive to 
difference, as if one’s perspective would be uninfluenced by race, 
class, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, age, or ability, for example. But if 
there is no coherent subject for feminism or LGBTQI+, how are 
solidarity claims and political actions justified? Essentialism can be 
seen to come under sustained attack on two grounds: first, that it fails 
to take into account racial, cultural, and class differences between 
group members, known as the particularity argument; second, that it 
posits a normative ideal of the essential that organizes the group, 
known as the normativity argument. The particularity argument, which 
targets the metaphysics of gender in the feminist and also queer 
context, proposes that if gender were separable from, for example, race 
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and class in an essentialist manner, all women would experience 
womanhood in the same way. And this is clearly false. The 
normativity argument targets the political counterpart of a binary 
gender metaphysics (Mikkola 2019). Feminist or queer identity 
politics presupposes essentialism if that politics is said to be mobilized 
around women or queer people as a categorical group where 
membership in this group is fixed by essentia that members 
supposedly share and that define their gender/sexuality/ 
womanhood/queerness (Heyes 2020). Thus, essentialist identity 
politics does not ground ethically sustainable action. But if both the 
particularity argument and the normativity argument apply, how can 
feminist and queer claims be justified? Could ethics, moral theory, and 
political action regarding difference justify the adoption of a relativist 
stance? Next I will consider whether that would solve the problems of 
essentialism and identity or ipso facto create a new problem.  
2.4. Problem of Relativism 
In a post-truth world, moral relativism is widely and controversially 
discussed both inside and outside of philosophy. Although many 
philosophers are quite critical of moral relativism, there are several 
contemporary philosophers who defend forms of it. Most often moral 
relativism is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep 
and widespread moral disagreements, and a metaethical thesis that 
the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but 
relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons 
(Gowans 2019; Tong 1996; Quinn 2004; Code 2007; Mühlebach 
2016). 
The problem of relativism is a particular feminist concern, for two 
reasons. Firstly, accommodating difference is a key notion in 
feminist theory. Secondly, feminist approaches are sometimes 
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accused of being relativistic per se, seeking to correct bias by 
promoting a sexism that favors women. On the second note, the 
majority of those invested in developing feminist approaches cannot 
fairly be accused of operating under such a premise. On the contrary, 
most approaches argue that morality is for and about everyone: if 
“male” interests, issues, agency, and values do not exhaust the full 
range of moral life, neither do “female” ones (Tong 1996). On the 
first note, however, the situation is more complex. Feminist thinkers 
maintain that multiple perspectives should guide the production of 
moral knowledge (Nyrövaara 2011, 39; Dickenson 2004; Diniz and 
Gonzáles Vélez 2001; Nicholas 1999; Sherwin 1992; Shildrick 1997; 
Tong 1996). In terms of bioethics, this leads to the problem of 
knowing how to build a framework that is “relativistic enough to 
accommodate diversities between individuals and societies”—that is, 
we want to avoid being morally imperialistic—yet “universal enough 
to serve as a common base from which we can launch collaborative 
moral action” (Quinn 2004, 110).  
It appears that feminist bioethicists have proposed two related 
approaches as an answer to the problem of relativism. In the first 
approach, some form of relativism is inevitable and even desirable 
(Nyrövaara 2011, 39; Dickenson 2004; Diniz and Gonzáles Vélez 
2001; Nicholas 1999; Sherwin 1992; Shildrick 1997; Tong 1996; 
Lindemann 2007). The idea that some form of relativism is 
inevitable and desirable in feminist bioethics is known as feminist 
relativism, an idea introduced to bioethics by Susan Sherwin (1992; 
Nyrövaara 2011, 39; Tong 1996). Sherwin (1992, 59–68) maintains 
that absolutist principles are oppressive and must be criticized. At the 
same time, however, relativist principles are challenging because 




Eeva Nyrövaara (2011, 39–40) makes two interesting notes about 
feminist relativism. For her, feminist relativism could be identified 
with value pluralism, defined as the view that there are several 
values that may be equally correct and fundamental and yet conflict 
with each other. Limits to pluralism are accepted if vital human 
needs are violated. The conviction that oppression is always wrong 
should guide moral evaluations and decision-making in feminist 
bioethics. Those in favor of feminist relativism acknowledge the 
contextual and provisional nature of moral judgments and maintain 
that there is no absolute right or wrong. However, social and cultural 
practices can and should be interrogated, essentially to assess 
whether those practices reinforce subordination. Second, this type of 
relativism is not radical moral relativism, which states that moral or 
value systems are too incompatible to evaluate. Instead, feminist 
relativism can be called modest moral relativism, which claims that 
value systems can be evaluated and compared, and on the basis of 
this evaluation morality can evolve and value systems change. Those 
in favor of modest moral relativism maintain that the task of 
philosophy is to seek principles by which moral or value systems can 
be evaluated (see e.g. Niiniluoto 1996). Additionally, core feminism 
could provide a basis for evaluating a value system, especially for its 
oppressive elements (Donchin and Purdy 1999; Nyrövaara 2011, 39–
40). I will return to core feminism in the section focusing on feminist 
bioethics.  
Feminists maintain that there are many different realities, and thus 
there is no single truth in moral discourse. This does not, however, 
mean that there is no moral objectivity at all (Nyrövaara 2011, 39). 
Similarly, Gowans (2019) notes that discussions of moral relativism 
often assume that moral relativism is the correct account of all moral 
judgments or of none. For Gowans, perhaps it is the correct account 
of some moral judgments but not others; or more vaguely, the best 
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account of morality vis-à-vis these issues would acknowledge both 
relativist and objectivist elements, in something of a mixed position. 
Gowans (ibid.) contends that on the empirical level, it might be 
thought that there are many substantial moral disagreements but also 
some striking moral agreements across different societies. On the 
metaethical plane, it might be supposed that although many 
disagreements are not likely to be rationally resolved, other 
disagreements may be (and perhaps the cross-cultural agreements we 
find have a rational basis). Fair enough? In my view, not quite. To 
withhold reason in a positivist sense as a key factor in resolving 
moral conflict is not a fair representation of the human condition. 
However, reconfiguring moral justification does not equate with a 
relativist stance. As feminist philosophy has advocated, feelings, 
passions, and affects can help us to achieve greater moral reflection, 
and it is unwise and unjust to construct rationality through efforts to 
somehow transcend them with the mythology of the god’s eye view 
(Lloyd 1984; Code 2007).  
How should we then view moral justification and reconcile moral 
differences more saliently? Donna Haraway (1988, 579) names 
radical constructivism and feminist critical empiricism as the poles 
of a dichotomy that tempts and traps feminists, warning that 
dissolving this tension prematurely would block feminist accounts of 
“a real world” and critical analyses of the radical historical 
contingency of power-implicated knowledge and subjectivity. She 
advocates “a feminist objectivity of limited location and situated 
knowledge” (ibid., 583), which responds to the pull of empiricism, 
location, and situation with the pull of constructivism and diversely 
enacted subjectivities. Knowledge claims would thus gain or fail to 
achieve acknowledgment situationally: situations neither so alike as 
to permit interchangeable, universal analyses nor so idiosyncratic as 
to require radically separate and distinct analyses. In Code’s (2007, 
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226) reading of Haraway, situation is “a place to know in two 
senses”: a place where knowledge is produced, and a place that itself 
demands to be known, with political, demographic, and material-
physical features that facilitate or thwart democratic knowing. 
Situation, then, is not just a place “from which to know,” as 
perspectives talk implies, which is indifferently available to anyone 
who chooses to stand there. Instead, practices for negotiating 
empiricism start to emerge. Further, for Code (ibid., 226–227), 
central to such practices are questions about why a knowledge claim 
is accepted or fails to gain acknowledgment. Answers are as much 
about epistemic responsibilities to engage in open, democratic debate 
on matters of knowledge and acknowledgment, so as to cultivate 
sensitivity to difference, alterity, and moments of 
incommensurability, as they are about correspondence and 
replicability. Phenomenologically put, the Othering that objectifies 
gives way to engagements with an alterity that elicits reciprocal 
respect (ibid.). 
I will next implement this problematic more deeply in the realm of 
bioethics. I suggest that the concept of vulnerability offers a feminist 
and queer bioethically salient framework in which to resolve it.  
2.5. Problem-Solving via Layered Vulnerability 
The concept of vulnerability first emerged into bioethics from 
research ethics in the 1970s that often labeled certain 
subpopulations—for example, women—as vulnerable, without being 
very resourceful in solving ethical issues stemming from that 
vulnerability. In recent decades, however, vulnerability has been 
reconfigured in bioethical theory. The rigid understanding that Luna 
(2009; 2018; Luna &Vanderpoel 2013) calls the subpopulation 
approach has been challenged with morally more salient approaches, 
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contributing new ideas to debates about the ethical dimensions of 
medicine and health care (ten Have 2016). Vulnerability cannot be 
fully understood within the framework of individual autonomy, 
which can dominate mainstream bioethics; rather, vulnerability is 
perceived as created through the social and economic conditions of 
life (ten Have 2016; Rogers et al. 2012; Meek Lange et al. 2013; 
Macklin 2012).  
From the inception of the field, bioethics has set out to protect 
vulnerable patients and research subjects from harm, and to establish 
their moral and legal rights (Holmes 1999, 48; Wolf 1999). 
According to a persistent line of critique, however, gender-related 
inequalities, cis- and heteronormativity, and biases based on 
race/ethnicity, class, and ability continue to go unacknowledged 
(Lindemann 2007; Nelson 1998, 2012; Stramondo 2016; Ray 2020). 
For Holmes (1999, 49–53), the long-standing disempowerment of 
patients despite bioethics’ long-standing concern about vulnerable 
populations begs the question of whether bioethics’ alliance with 
institutionalized power keeps it closed to issues that concern so-
called marginalized groups. It can be argued, however, that the vague 
formulation of such critiques, which target a generalization of 
“bioethics,” makes it difficult to address and resolve such issues. 
What I suggest is the formulation of a queer feminist framework for 
reconfiguring key bioethical concepts. In my analysis, vulnerability 
has become central (Sudenkaarne 2018b, 2019, 2020b), which is 
what I will focus on next. Moreover, however, a queer feminist 
framework should guide the reconfiguration of bioethical principles, 
which I will discuss later.  
Although marginalized groups have unique standpoints, those views 
often get eliminated from conversation as nonuniversal. For some 
feminist critics, it is the deeply structured embrace of liberal 
individualism that obscures the importance of groups (Holmes 1999, 
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53). To reiterate, in this line of thinking, social groups are tools of 
oppression: one’s identity can make one particularly vulnerable to 
cultural imperialism (including the stereotyping, erasure, or 
appropriation of one’s group identity), violence, exploitation, 
marginalization, or powerlessness. What becomes crucial about the 
“identity” in identity politics in this context appears to be the 
experience of the subject; yet that experience is shaped by 
memberships of social groups (Heyes 2020). These groups are surely 
important and necessary for self-esteem, physical and emotional 
survival, and the joys and pleasures of life (Holmes 1999, 58). But 
when certain groups are marginalized, does every member of that 
group also get marginalized? For Holmes (ibid.), if bioethics focuses 
on individual rights, bioethics may exacerbate group marginalization. 
This is also pivotal to Donchin and Purdy (1999, 8–9), who see 
power and particularity, the very dynamics of grouping, as dominant 
in feminist critiques: the powers that divide and marginalize 
nondominant people, and the particularities of personal lives that 
resist confinement within externally imposed categories.  
The notion of marginalized groups and vulnerability ushers the 
problems of essentialism, identity, and relativism into bioethics. If 
for example LGBTQI+ people are considered particularly 
vulnerable, what about intersectional differences in for example 
affluence and access to health care? How can one remain a powerful 
subject and yet be considered vulnerable? How are we to use 
vulnerability as a tool for ethical analysis? I wish to next discuss how 
the reconfigured notion of vulnerability is indeed a useful concept 
for feminist and queer bioethics, as it can offer a salient way to solve 
the problems of identity, essentialism, and relativism.  
An excessively broad use of the concept of vulnerability renders it 
too nebulous to be meaningful, and has a stereotyping effect. Luna 
(2018, 1–2) distinguishes between two spheres in vulnerability 
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debates: conceptually, how vulnerability should be understood; and 
practically, how it should be accurately used. To answer the 
conceptual question, she (2009) has reconfigured vulnerability for 
use as a layered concept. Her approach to vulnerability has been 
notably accepted and applied (e.g. Rogers et al. 2012; Meek Lange et 
al. 2013; Macklin 2012).  
For Luna (2009, 122), the reconfiguration of vulnerability is 
motivated by the previously mentioned realization that vulnerability 
has not been favorable to people considered vulnerable. Her 
reconfigurations stem from feminist analyses and look at 
vulnerability as a concept of special interest to women. In research 
ethics, women are sometimes considered a vulnerable group, and at 
other times are removed from such a group. For Luna, labeling 
women or any group simply as vulnerable is too simplistic, and is a 
potential source of grave moral harm if we perceive vulnerability in 
terms of “being vulnerable”—for example, women being essentially 
vulnerable, rather than being rendered vulnerable in certain 
conditions with certain resources—so that vulnerability becomes a 
fixed label attached to certain subpopulations. This includes the 
assumption that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that 
populations must fulfill to be considered vulnerable. When 
vulnerability is used as a fixed label for a particular subpopulation, it 
suggests a simplistic answer to a complicated problem. To address 
the subject’s vulnerability, more than one answer may be needed. 
Different types of vulnerabilities can overlap, and they should all be 
adequately considered. Finally, yet importantly, labeling fixes 
content, and labels do not come off easily (ibid., 123–124; cf. ten 
Have 2016). 
For Luna (2009, 128), then, it becomes necessary to provide an 
analysis of vulnerability that does not render it vacuous, rescues its 
force, and avoids some of the morally gravest flaws of labeled 
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vulnerability. She suggests an ethically more sustainable, humanely 
robust, and pragmatically useful concept of vulnerability as layered. 
The metaphor of a layer gives the idea of relationality, of something 
that may be multiple and different but also overlapping: some 
overlapping layers may be related to health, and others to work, yet 
both are connected. For example, it can be said that being a woman 
does not per se imply that a person is vulnerable, but in a country 
that is intolerant of women’s reproductive rights, a woman acquires 
that layer of vulnerability. If she is poor and illiterate, she has two 
more layers of vulnerability. Therefore, we should not think that 
someone is vulnerable, but instead should consider a particular 
situation that renders someone vulnerable, which does not mean a 
categorical lack of power (ibid., 129). 
Moreover, for Luna (ibid., 134), a layered understanding of 
vulnerability challenges idealized views of the neoliberal subject and 
agency, since the most serious shortcoming of the rigid vulnerability 
approach is to treat vulnerability as a label affixed to a particular 
subpopulation. In Luna and Vanderpoel’s (2013, 326) account, to 
target subpopulations with a labeling strategy is to assume a baseline 
standard, or a paradigmatic subject: a mature, moderately well-
educated, clear-thinking, literate, self-supporting person. Further, the 
subpopulation approach assumes the possibility of identifying 
vulnerabilities in subpopulations as variations from the paradigm. A 
consequence of the categorical model is a simplistic answer to a 
complicated problem, as a person or group of persons can suffer 
differ kinds of vulnerabilities. The label approach understands 
vulnerability as targeting a permanent and categorical condition that 
will persist throughout the person’s existence. Thus, subpopulation 
analysis can lead to an overly rigid and fixed perspective. In contrast, 
if vulnerability is viewed as layered, there is no single feature that in 
and of itself defines vulnerability, no solid and unique vulnerability 
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that will exhaust a category, and most importantly, no single feature 
that can suffice to explain it entirely (ibid.). 
I suggest that reconfigured vulnerability offers a way to consider the 
material bearings of race, gender, and sexuality while also 
encompassing situated, contextual differences in experiences of 
them. Such a reconfigured analysis aims to detect risks and harms 
that are not causal but probable in varying degrees. Layered 
vulnerability offers an escape from the looping problems of identity, 
essentialism, and relativism. Instead, it creates a bioethical approach 
that identifies, evaluates, removes, and alleviates layers of 
vulnerabilities in a particular context. Luna urges us to consider the 
dispositional structure of layers of vulnerability, and to assess what 
stimulus conditions can trigger them (their presence and their 
probability of developing). Stimulus conditions relate the layers and 
context with actual conditions and possibilities of occurrence. If the 
stimulus conditions are highly probable, they should take priority. 
These conditions are those that actualize the layer of vulnerability 
and will provoke actual harm. Following on from this identification 
and evaluation is the obligation to not worsen the person’s or group’s 
vulnerability, to try to eliminate their layers of vulnerability, or at the 
very least to minimize the layers5 (Luna 2018, 7–8). I will return to 
develop a queer feminist framework for vulnerability in the last 
section of this introduction. To ground that work and to establish 
some feminist and queer concerns, I will first establish them in 
reference to bioethical principlism. 
 
5 These obligations, and also the language of risks, can be seen to resonate with 
principles, but Luna herself does not make that connection.  
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2.6. On Bioethical Principlism 
Simply put, the notion of principlism refers to an approach that 
utilizes abstract principles to identify and reflect on bioethical 
problems. Principles can either be derived from theory or not; in the 
latter case they are often justified by so-called common morality 
(Ashcroft et al. 2007; Arras 2016). The common-morality approach 
by Beauchamp and Childress (2013) is influential both in academic 
inquiry into bioethics and also in clinical work and ethical 
evaluations of medical encounters, systems, and policies. To 
reiterate, the four common principles as defined by them (ibid., 13) 
are: respect for autonomy (a norm respecting and supporting 
autonomous decision-making); nonmaleficence (a norm avoiding the 
causation of harm); beneficence (a group of norms pertaining to the 
relief, lessening, or prevention of harm, the provision of benefits, and 
the balancing of benefits against risks and costs); and justice (a group 
of norms to fairly distribute benefits, risks, and costs). These abstract 
principles are accompanied by rules or other elements to inform 
moral contemplation, which also often utilize RE (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2013; Ashcroft et al. 2007; Arras 2016).  
From a queer feminist viewpoint, risks, costs, and benefits have not 
been well balanced in the history of medical ethics (Wolf 1996; 
Holmes 1999; Wahlert and Fiester 2014). One of the key queer 
feminist critiques is that common morality reproduces moral 
objectivity as an unsituated rationality that is prone to be biased 
toward the moral realities and views of those with more social 
power. Further, the concept of autonomy, whether unfairly 
emphasized in principlist applications or not, is considered 
insufficiently attuned to relationality. Another key problem is the 
relationship between common morality and moral theory, which also 
affects the interpretation and contextualization of the principles. 
Even though common-morality approaches often reject moral theory, 
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they often end up referring to it anyway: beneficence is often drawn 
from Mill, autonomy from Kant and Mill, justice from Rawls, and 
nonmaleficence from Gert (Tong 1996, 69; Clouser & Gert 1990, 
223; Donchin 2001, 366). Principlist approaches that do derive from 
moral theory tend to similarly mix and match, “presenting the 
resultant blend as an integrated and unified theory whereas nothing 
could be further from the truth” (Tong 1996, 69; Clouser & Gert 
1990; Donchin 2001).  
If there is a general problem with principlism, in my view, the 
problem is its confused relation to moral theory. Adding to the 
confusion, Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 351) do sometimes refer 
to their prominent account of ethics as a theory, but deny that it is an 
integrated body of moral norms or a systematic justification of basic 
moral norms. Yet whether or not a common-morality view can 
escape the latter can be contested. Indeed, theories evoking common 
morality can be seen to constitute a category of common-morality 
theory (Holm 1995; Arras 2016). Somewhat acknowledging this, 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 422–423) refer to the problems of 
common-morality theory, leaving its specification, judgment, 
coherence, and construction for further research. Even though these 
issues might be exhausted from several avenues—for example, by 
borrowing from virtue ethics, as Beauchamp and Childress most 
eagerly suggest, or from obligations or WRE—none of these 
solutions in my view can resolve the fundamentally confused relation 
to moral theory without admitting that principlism is a moral theory, 
in which case it becomes internally confused as a moral theory that 
borrows from various approaches while fully adhering to none. 
Further, acknowledging the critical work of feminist philosophy 
regarding how the premises of Western philosophy are built on 
gendered, racialized, binary, and hierarchical concepts (Lloyd 1984; 
Code 2007; Lugones 1994; Anzaldúa 1999), I suggest that the 
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formulation of a queer feminist framework, to be further developed 
into a background theory, might offer reliable responses.  
How to challenge the requirements of universality and impartiality 
without overlooking the importance of particularity, context, and the 
relational bonds of moral life (cf. Holmes 1999, 53)? Does shifting 
the direction of bioethical practice from its preoccupation with 
abstract undifferentiated individuals to the concrete particularities 
that shape the lives of embodied, socially situated humans require the 
eradication of principles (cf. Donchin and Purdy 1999, 6)? I concur 
that a concern for particularities is an admirable antidote to the 
lifeless, overly broad strokes into which moral philosophy at its 
worst can reduce the richness of moral life. However, I also concur 
that we must beware of devaluing principles excessively (Purdy 
1992, 10). Instead, I think it is safe to say that principles have 
become a consistent and concise way to press some basic concerns in 
medical ethics, including the expansion of horizons from pragmatic 
ethics to motivating moral theories (ibid.). Values such as justice are 
defensible against possible alternatives only if we conceive of ethics 
as a social institution that should promote the well-being of all. This 
is particularly important for marginalized groups such as women, 
LGBTQI+ people, and racialized people, as they have specific 
biomedical needs that tend to go undetected, and they can also suffer 
great intersectional moral harms. Furthermore, it can be suggested 
that this kind of moral assumption safeguards us against the 
naturalistic fallacy and keeps us from succumbing to relativism 
(Purdy 1992, 10–11; see also Macklin 2003). A greater attention to 
difference is not incompatible with principles, and a principlist 
approach does not require commitment to acontextual universalism 
(Wolf 1999, 74). 
But is there any single set of ethical principles or human values that 
exists independently of the cultural context in which it has been 
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produced? Probably not, unless one is committed to the view that 
ethical principles are generated in some metaphysical realm prior to 
the beginning of temporality and spatiality. Alternatively, are there 
certain guiding human values, such as human flourishing or the 
meeting of people’s needs, that emerge in any and all sustainable 
contexts? Probably there are. But even if such ethical commonalities 
exist, their existence in no way guarantees their uniform 
interpretation, let alone their actual instantiation. This is why 
bioethical theories must include critical lenses clear enough to 
recognize the unjust power relations that result in wrongful 
distributions of limited resources, and a motivational force strong 
enough to prompt people who currently benefit from unjust power 
relations to renounce them (Tong 2013, 29–30). A queer feminist 
framework is to serve as one such lens.  
For many critics, the problem with principlism is not the 
employment of principles as the units of moral analysis, but the 
abuse of them. A further problem is the severe curtailment of the set 
of pertinent ethical concepts utilized in bioethics (Fiester 2015, 310). 
Exclusion and marginalization are forms of this abuse, as are all 
processes that render the socially less powerful in a moral conflict as 
unintelligible or indeed immoral; for example, clinical ethical 
conflicts that appear wildly imbalanced morally can result from 
unrecognized principles (ibid.). Autumn Fiester (ibid.), in my view 
laudably, notes that principles can become weaponized against the 
morally vulnerable. The weaponization of principles begins with the 
false assumption that all of the pertinent bioethical principles and 
legitimate moral considerations have already been articulated and are 
limited in number. This becomes a principlist paradigm where 
principles operate like a diagnostic checklist that scans for a handful 
of ethical considerations in clinical encounters, systems, and policies 
and then makes its normative assessment based entirely on that 
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reductive set of ethical concerns. This is principlism at its worst, and 
is not compatible with Beauchamp and Childress’s approach. Such 
poor ethical analysis can inadvertently weaponize the principles it 
does recognize, to the detriment of causes and claims anchored by 
the principles it does not recognize (Fiester 2015, 310–311; see also 
Donchin and Purdy 1999; Lindemann 2007). To offer more dexterity 
to the framework of a principlist approach, I will next turn to 
feminist and queer bioethics.  
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3. More Than Strange Bedfellows: Feminist and 
Queer Bioethical Approaches 
I will next discuss feminist bioethics and queer bioethics in more 
detail. I will offer brief histories of feminist and queer bioethics, and 
I will also focus on the feminist and queer bioethics that have been 
most influential for my work, including a consideration of them in 
relation to principlism and RE. I will also discuss critical responses 
and tensions between feminist and queer theory.  
3.1. Add Women and Stir? Feminist Bioethics 
As the field of bioethics has professionalized and diversified, 
questions have arisen about its direction and focus. Notwithstanding 
its early attention to instances of exploitation and abuse, some critics 
have discerned an increasing conservatism in bioethics that neglects 
the concerns of marginalized groups (Donchin & Scully 2015; 
Donchin & Purdy 1999; Holmes 1999; Lindemann 2007). The 
argument is that bioethicists tend to frame issues and formulate 
theory from the vantage point of privileged social and professional 
groups, even in the developing regions of the world, as local 
bioethicists there seek a share in the prestige of high-technology 
medicine. During the 1980s, feminists in particular argued that 
bioethics was developing in a way that gave too little attention to 
gender-specific disparities in health care research and therapy, or to 
the effects of other power disparities, such as class and ethnicity, on 
quality of health care (Donchin and Scully 2015; Donchin and Purdy 
1999; Holmes 1999; Lindemann 2007). 
By the early 1990s, feminist bioethics had emerged as a distinctive 
academic focus, offering insights into how gender, ethnicity, and 
power disparities operate. These critiques evolved out of several 
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lines of influence. One was the late 20th-century women’s health 
movement. In the early years of second-wave feminism, activist 
feminists directed attention to areas of health care where women’s 
interests were the most obvious but the most severely neglected: 
access to birth control and abortion, pregnancy, and the control of 
representations of female sexuality. Feminists campaigned on 
clinical issues with direct relevance to women’s biology: for 
increased research into breast cancer, more convenient and cheaper 
contraceptive methods, more research into the physiology of 
menopause, and the avoidance of unnecessary surgical interventions 
(e.g. hysterectomies, cesarean sections, radical mastectomies) where 
alternatives are available. These campaigns were supported by 
several advocacy groups and by a number of global women’s health 
movements. These groups and movements struggled to raise public 
awareness of women’s health issues, influence national health 
policies, and act as a counterbalance to the priorities of professional 
medicine and the pharmaceutical industry (Donchin and Scully 2015; 
Donchin and Purdy 1999; Holmes 1999; Wolf 1996). 
According to Hilde Lindemann (2007, 116–117), even though the 
bioethics movement and second-wave feminism emerged 
overlappingly in the late 1960s in Canada and the US, the two had 
little to say to one another for the better part of two decades. If we 
track down the early dissemination of feminist bioethics, it was not 
until 1989 that the feminist philosophy journal Hypatia published 
two special issues devoted to feminism and medical ethics. The 
1990s saw a steady stream of conferences, monographs, anthologies, 
and essays that examined bioethical issues through a feminist lens 
(ibid., 116–117; Donchin and Scully 2015).The Feminist Approaches 
to Bioethics network, with its journal IJFAB: International Journal 
of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, has been essential in 
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facilitating the labors of feminist bioethical scholarship from diverse 
backgrounds (Donchin and Purdy 1999, vii).  
For Lindemann (2007, 117), who is a feminist bioethics pioneer and 
thus exceptionally well situated to evaluate where we have been and 
where we are going in feminist bioethics, the primary contribution of 
feminism to bioethics is to note how imbalances of power in what 
she calls the sex-gender system—which in my treatment should be 
expanded to cis- and heteronormativity—play themselves out in 
medical practice, systems, policies, and theories surrounding them. 
Lindemann argues, and I obviously concur, that feminism has more 
to offer bioethics than this sort of critique, even though the latter is 
crucial in its own right.  
One of the unique contributions of feminism to moral theory in 
general has been to find gender bias in the preoccupations, 
assumptions, and perspectives of the dominant theories in Anglo-
American ethics (Lindemann 2007, 117). This activity has produced 
feminist correctives to mainstream Kantian and utilitarian theories. 
Rejecting the role of the ideal ethical reasoner as solitary and 
powerful, which has been constructed in the history of philosophy as 
masculine, and excluding sense-making modes deemed to be 
feminine (Lloyd 1984), both feminist and nonfeminist standpoints 
have seen the emergence of theories about ethical deliberation as an 
expressive-collaborative process in which a group of people strive 
for mutual moral intelligibility and forge shared understandings of 
responsibility (Lindemann 2007, 117–118). While feminist ethicists 
have enriched ethical theory in these many ways, Lindemann claims 
that feminist bioethicists have not yet done the same for bioethical 
theory. She (ibid., 118) observes that in the growing body of 
literature that has accumulated since the 1990s, feminist 
contributions to bioethics have largely remained focused on “rather 
narrowly defined critique,” with little theory-building. Although 
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theoretical aspirations have increased, a vast majority of feminist 
bioethical critique continues to be directed at practices surrounding 
the care of women’s bodies, and in particular the parts that mark 
them as different from men. When feminist bioethics has moved 
beyond reproduction, it has tended to critique practices of health care 
for women. Yet such critiques also touch on more pervasive issues, 
e.g. on the limits of physicians’ authority, the conflation of moral 
and medical values, and the boundaries between definitions of 
sickness and immorality (Donchin and Purdy 1999, 10; Wolf 1996; 
1999). It is crucial to bear in mind that despite the importance of 
continued critique of the politics and practices surrounding wombs 
and other gendered body parts, there are many other health care 
issues requiring an ethical analysis that is sensitive to imbalances of 
power within the binary gender system. Further, according to 
Lindemann, feminist bioethicists’ contributions to ethical theory 
have focused on the ethics of care (on which see e.g. Gilligan 1982; 
Held 2005; Carse & Nelson 1996; Tong 2013), which is subjectable 
although not reducible to gender essentialism (caring as essential to 
women, women essentially as carers).  
Why ought feminists to scrutinize medical practice as they build 
moral theory? Why should there be feminist bioethics? Medicine 
ought to be a particular concern for feminists because it is one of the 
hegemonic discourses of our time, commanding enormous amounts 
of prestige and authority, and interacting with gender at many levels 
and in many different ways. Feminists need to review that 
interaction, but they also need to learn from it. Lindemann (2007, 
122–123) urges that we should take on cutting-edge topics addressed 
by nonfeminist bioethics, such as neuroethics; but we should use 
“our own” methodology, paying careful attention to how gender is 
installed and reinforced by power as it circulates through our 
practices of responsibility.  
 
43 
Following up on Lindemann’s critique, this type of inquiry is gaining 
momentum (see e.g. Fink 2019). Simultaneously with this work, 
Lindemann suggests new possibilities for bioethical theory to be 
built from feminist epistemology and feminist narrative ethics. 
Feminist epistemological approaches can help to theorize the 
legitimacy of patients’ experiential testimonies. As a number of 
feminist epistemologies have argued, cognitive authority is 
dependent on social position: it requires a certain standing within 
one’s community. What a scientist can know, for example, and with 
whom she can work to advance knowledge, depends crucially on 
how she is situated (cf. Haraway 1988) vis-à-vis those who know 
authoritatively (Lindemann 2007, 122). This is ipso facto a crucial 
stance to improve medical knowledge overall, considering the fact 
that medical data that supposedly applies to all people is often 
gathered from trials that exclude women altogether (Baylis et al. 
1999; Paul et al. 2017).  
Lindemann (2007, 123) offers feminist narrative ethics as a 
methodology to meet these critiques. I will next discuss feminist 
narrative ethics in relation to other bioethical methodologies when 
considering the need for queer feminist moral theory. I conclude that 
the narrative approach has similarities with moral archeology and 
WRE, both of which can be used for queer feminist intersectional 
research. Yet what is required for a research project, case analysis, or 
ethical guideline to be sustainable from a queer feminist point of 
view is to have gender and sexual diversity, not cis- and 
heteronormativity, within its normative framework. In my view, this 
is most reliably guaranteed with a commitment to theory rather than 
by leaving it to methodology or consensus.  
Lindemann’s narrative ethics targets such modes of principlism that 
derive from one or several of the mainstream moral theories to the 
situation at hand. Principles produced by the theory then serve as 
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guides to right conduct. Lindemann calls this the theoretical-juridical 
model of morality and moral theory. When judged skillfully and well 
in the theoretical-juridical model, a consideration of social contexts 
such as gender might have some bearing on which principles are 
pertinent and how much relative importance to assign to conflicting 
principles. However, according to Lindemann, the theoretical-
juridical model allows the commentator—once they have gotten hold 
of the correct principles and a rationale for ranking them—to 
disregard the context. Presumably, the commentator can only then 
judge impartially what ought to be done in any similar set of 
circumstances (ibid.). Further, in actual clinical cases, the 
commentator either implicitly or explicitly evaluates the logic and 
justifications used in moral deliberation, especially if there are 
contrasting views, such as in a disagreement about a patient’s care 
between health care professionals and family members. In such 
situations, moral deliberation is often affected by morally salient 
particularities and social contexts. The crucial question becomes 
whether this makes moral justifications necessarily flawed in a 
fundamental way. The obvious response in many bioethical 
approaches is that of course it does not, but for Lindemann (ibid.), 
the narrative approach questions the theoretical-juridical model of 
morality and moral theory, including beyond moral justification.  
Following the narrative approach, Lindemann (ibid., 124) argues that 
social contexts are important not because they guide the selection of 
principles that will be used to resolve the case, but because of “what 
they reveal about the identities” of the participants: the ethnic, 
gender, sexual, and other settings in which a person lives her life 
contribute to—but do not determine, I might add—her own and 
others’ “sense of who she is.” While those espousing the theoretical-
juridical model could in principle (no pun intended) take the same 
view as narrativists of the moral importance of social context, for 
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Lindemann (ibid.) the narrative approach uniquely features what she 
calls the temporal context. Because theoretical-juridical methods 
center on an ethical analysis of the present moment, and because 
arguments used in the analysis are themselves atemporal, those who 
employ these methods tend to approach the morally troublesome 
situation as if it too were atemporal. Yet the story of how the 
participants in the case came to their present pass is precisely a story, 
as is the narrative of the best way to go in the future. For Lindemann, 
the backward-looking story is explanatory and the forward-looking 
story action-guiding. Approaches based on the theoretical-juridical 
model tend to move only sideways, considering context as it “fleshes 
out the here and now.” Because narrative approaches also move 
backward and forward, they are better suited to ethical reflection 
than are theoretical-juridical approaches (ibid., 123–124). 
In clinical case evaluation, the backward-looking stories deliberators 
tell about the participants in an ethical case have explanatory force: 
they supply the temporal setting that allows us to make sense of what 
the various actors are now doing. The sideways stories broaden our 
understanding of the “now”: they exhibit the effect of the various 
contexts of the participants’ present identities. Through a narrative 
approach, Lindemann (ibid., 125) suggests, it becomes possible to 
tell counterstories: to challenge the ideology of universally shared 
values without losing one’s cognitive authority as a moral agent (cf. 
Fiester 2015); to acknowledge justifications that build on morally 
salient, temporal, and spatial particularities. For Lindemann (2007, 
125), moral terms and general rules can be regarded as markers of 
the moral relevance of certain features of the story. Certain features 
of the retold story suggest ways of understanding the relevant moral 
ideas, and these ideas in turn may point to other, previously 
neglected details of the story. The story is finished when the 
augmented context and its attendant moral concepts are in a state of 
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equilibrium that allows the deliberators to see the situation from the 
patient’s point of view. The deliberators do this by putting into 
equilibrium the details of all the previously told stories and the moral 
descriptions that are suggested by them. From their sense of how the 
narrative pieces shed light on one another, they construct the closing 
story of “how to best go on from here” (ibid., 126). For Lindemann, 
in the theoretical-juridical model, morality is a matter of applying 
codified rules derived from comprehensive theories as criteria for 
assessing wrongdoing and making rational choices. The narrative 
approach  
sees morality instead as continual interpersonal becoming and 
remaining mutually intelligible. It is expressive of who we are 
and hope to be; it is collaborative in that it deposits a community 
of inquirers that need to live well together; and it is feminist 
because it offers a means of resisting powerful ideologies. 
(Lindemann 2007, 127) 
Lindemann’s approach utilizes a notion of RE. A standard method 
for applied ethics, it has been debated in feminist research. 
According to Haslanger (1999, 466), RE is a strategy by means of 
which we are able to adjust our judgments about principles, possibly 
revealing cases of racism, for example, in knowledge attributions of 
the case at hand (i.e. the issue under bioethical inquiry) (Mühlebach 
2016, 878). Even though RE would primarily allow us to reveal 
errors in the application of concepts due to discriminating 
background assumptions, it can be objected that our moral intuitions 
about theories or principles would be independent of each other: if 
we have reason to believe that some of our judgments are distorted 
due to sexist background beliefs, then it is by no means clear that the 
theories and principles we are working with are free from this 
sexism. Mühlebach (ibid.) adds that even if commitments and 
theories were independent, we still could not offer an explanation of 
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why principles and theories should be considered to be immune to 
pernicious background assumptions. Hence WRE is needed, which 
also takes background theories into account (ibid., 880). Yet even if 
WRE allows us to sort out problematic concepts so as to critically 
reflect on the values we endorse, the fulfillment of feminist concerns 
is not guaranteed. As it is unclear how WRE can address the problem 
of ideology—defined as commitments that manifest in social 
practices (ibid.), with some proponents being explicitly pluralistic 
about systems of commitments (see e.g. Elgin 1996)—a queer 
feminist intersectional framework that builds on gender and sexual 
variance embedded in human rights is in my view needed to 
safeguard against the problem of relativism.  
Narrativity and WRE can both be used to “mine” cases for their 
morally relevant considerations. The method of moral archeology 
has strong echoes of the central strategy and insight of the casuists 
(see e.g. Arras 1991; Fiester 2015, 311). Casuistry recognizes the 
need to expand the moral lens by focusing on what Arras (1991, 37) 
calls “moral diagnosis.” Arras (ibid., 31–33) has articulated the 
casuistical approach as a derivation of principles developed 
incrementally through the analysis of concrete cases, which enables 
principles to emerge gradually from reflection upon our responses to 
particular cases. This strategy is mirrored e.g. in the work of the 
hermeneutical school of clinical ethics consultation, in which the 
theoretical apparatus that one brings to case analysis is best viewed 
as “dynamic frameworks” that are “responsive to practice” (Fiester 
2015, 311). So a principlist approach does not have to follow the 
theoretical-juridical model of morality and moral theory.  
Beauchamp and Childress (2013) ipso facto deny that their 
principlism is a moral theory (which, however, can be argued against 
if/when common-morality theories are their own category of theory). 
Be that as it may, the framework Beauchamp and Childress suggest 
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is compatible with RE and the narrative approach suggested by 
Lindemann. Even though Beauchamp and Childress’s principlism 
can be seen to include a confused and perhaps also insufficient 
relationship to theory, Lindemann’s approach has the same flaw. In 
my view, it is unclear what level of theoretical commitment leads the 
approach to follow a theoretical-juridical model of morality, and this 
begs the question of how approaches built on feminist theories are 
justified if the derivation of principles from theory makes the 
approach alien to situated moral life. Further, the emphasis 
narrativity puts on context and “who one is” evokes the problems of 
relativism, essentialism, and identity. Even though it is easy to see 
that a checklist type of principlism cannot be redeemed, many 
principlist approaches in bioethical research utilize reflection (either 
RE or WRE). However, even if we are to agree that WRE has a 
capacity to enable theorizing with “as few implicit and explicit 
biases as possible,” and includes an openness to changes in concept 
uses and background theory to a degree (Mühlebach 2016, 886; see 
also Arras 2007), for me it does not suffice for a queer feminist 
intersectional framework, as it instead offers a method of norms for 
such a framework.  
What I suggest is a principlist approach with a queer feminist 
framework. One of the key justifications for such an endeavor is the 
centrality of justice for feminist and queer bioethics. Donchin and 
Purdy (1999, 2) observe that despite the “much vaunted” diversity of 
feminism, it can be argued that at the heart of most feminist work is a 
set of judgments that seem central. A common thread is the 
acknowledgment that there are oppressed positions in society, and 
those positions often build on gender, race, and sexuality; that 
oppression is a form of injustice, and hence intolerable; that it is 
possible to change society in ways that could eliminate oppression; 
and that it is the goal of feminism to pursue the changes necessary to 
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accomplish this. Donchin and Purdy (ibid., 2–3) further urge the 
adoption of what they call core feminism for practical, political, and 
philosophical reasons. The pragmatics of it is its simple message: 
justice requires the eradication of inequality. Emphasizing this can 
help us to connect with other justice movements. I see this readiness 
to engage with behemoth philosophical concepts such as justice—
which indeed is one of the bioethical principles—as lending support 
to the reconfiguration of bioethical principles instead of their 
abandonment. Critical work on basic philosophical concepts and 
original new research will not merely enrich the philosophical canon 
but also recalibrate it. The politics of core feminism includes staying 
open to new ideas from lived lives, leaving room to disagree, and 
being open to difference. This should help to keep false 
universalization at bay (ibid., 4; see also Nyrövaara 2011). A 
framework building on core feminism can help us to navigate the 
problems of identity, essentialism, and relativism.  
For Donchin and Purdy (1999, 5–6), feminists have a lot to learn 
from one another and from members of other oppressed groups:  
Different realities do not mean we are enemies. The real enemies 
are those who ignore oppression, happily benefit from it, or seek 
to increase it. The metaethics we propose could help us all join 
together in the fight for a more just world. 
A feminist bioethical theory that follows this account would shift 
from preoccupations with abstract, undifferentiated individuals to the 
concrete particularities that shape the lives of embodied, socially and 
temporally situated humans. Similarly to Lindemann and Haraway, 
Donchin and Purdy (ibid., 6–8) see power and particularity as central 
to feminist critique: the powers that divide and marginalize 
nondominant people, and the particularities of personal lives that 
resist confinement within externally imposed categories. Constructed 
from the perspective of an elite group that is blinded to its own 
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partiality, theory tends to overlook such key components of moral 
life as context, partiality, and relational bonds, and further must be 
able to tackle them without succumbing to relativism. Core feminism 
calls for the incorporation of these insights into bioethical theory, 
and for an ethics that is capable of challenging the structures and 
systems that perpetuate disempowerment based on gender, sexuality, 
and race (ibid., 6–9).  
3.2. Making Sense of Queer Lives: Queer and LGBT 
Bioethics 
In addition to feminist bioethicists’ critical takes on gender and 
sexuality, why do we also need LGBTQI+ or queer bioethics?6 
Building the case for such a bioethics, let us take a step back and ask: 
what kind of bioethics should moral human beings strive for? As I 
have suggested, bioethics is faced with an extraordinarily difficult 
quandary: how to reconcile the clearly immense differences in the 
social and personal realities of moral life with the need to apply a 
universal standard to those fragments of experience that can foster 
not only comparison and evaluation but also action. For 
philosophers, the gulf between the universal and the particular may 
be regarded as “an irksome and perennial barrier”; but bioethicists, 
like clinicians and policy implementers, simply cannot function 
without finding a way of relating ethical deliberation to local 
contexts (Kleinman 1999, 70–71). For Katherine Dow (2016, 14), 
the critique of universalism in bioethics suggests that a better 
attunement to social scientific research could inform, and therefore 
strengthen, bioethical analysis, policy, and practice—and by 
 
6 It is critical to acknowledge that even though I use these concepts 
synonymously here, tensions between these approaches also exist (see e.g. Davy 
2015; Vipond 2015; Sudenkaarne 2020b). 
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implication “make it more ethical.” According to critics, there is an 
intractable tension between social scientists’ and bioethicists’ 
approaches to ethics because of the latter’s commitment to 
principles—albeit to varying degrees, with different sympathies and 
through different approaches—which can at worst succumb to 
paternalism and even moral imperialism (Dow 2016, 14–15; 
Callahan 1999; Huxtable 2013; Takala 2001; Cowley 2005; Holm 
1995).  
Dow (2016, 15) urges a critical overview of the individualism 
inherent in bioethics and the difficulty it has had with conceiving of 
ethics in a way that accounts for more communitarian values and 
experiences, which in her view reflects a stereotypical picture of 
people in Western countries as being primarily self-interested. For 
Dow, this debate points to a division between ethics as a constant 
process of self-fashioning and lived practice on one hand, and ethics 
as a set of codified principles governing a particular profession or 
practice on the other. In her view, bioethics, by its very nature, is 
required to prioritize principles over practices, which can mean 
failing to fully recognize the fact that professional ethics are 
inseparable from the wider ethical values and practices of the 
societies in which health care professionals and researchers operate. 
Paying homage to the feminist conception of situated knowledge, 
Barry Hoffmaster (2009, 1−2) believes in a bioethics that is “situated 
in lived human experience.” He also draws attention to the 
importance of emotions in ethical decisions: 
putting bioethics in personal, social, and cultural contexts opens 
the way for modes of moral deliberation that are not general, 
rational, and impartial but that embrace the distinctive histories, 
relationships, and milieus of people and engage their emotions as 
much as their reason. Such a bioethics also recognizes the 
multiple backgrounds—institutional, economic, historical, and 
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political—that structure moral problems and give meanings to 
moral concepts. This is a bioethics situated in lived human 
experience. The ultimate goal of this endeavor is a bioethics that 
is more attuned to the particular and more sensitive to the 
personal—a bioethics that is more humane and more helpful. 
(Ibid.) 
Dow (2016, 16) insists that bioethicists, along with policymakers and 
regulators, need to understand that context is not a euphemism for 
mitigating circumstances but instead a way of attuning oneself to the 
contingent realities of people’s lives. Nonetheless, an empirical turn 
can be traced in bioethics that takes direction from some of the 
leading figures in North American bioethics, such as Daniel 
Callahan, cofounder of the Hastings Center—which published one of 
the first special reports on queer bioethics in 2014—for greater 
attention to what Dow (ibid.) calls “alternative moral positions 
within bioethics.” While Dow urges bioethicists to attend to other 
moral worlds and try to develop models that take account of the 
multiple interests that may be at stake in any particular ethical 
decision, they should not assume that moralities can be read from 
laws or professional codes of conduct, or that moral philosophy is a 
mirror of ethics. Moreover, Dow (ibid.) sees bioethics per se as 
shaped by its context: the “bioethical” aspects of particular practices 
and objects are not self-evident but the product of the specific 
sociopolitical contexts and professional agendas of their time (cf. 
also Wilson 2011, 213). On this note, Dow urges us to consider what 
makes certain bioethical practices and issues worthy of our ethical 
attention—and by extension, what makes others unworthy of such 
attention. Traditionally, issues of gender and sexuality have been in 
the latter category. Despite the empirical turn both acknowledged by 
Dow and promoted by prolific research centers such as Hastings, and 
as gravely pointed out by LGBTQI+ and queer bioethicists (Wahlert 
and Fiester 2012, 2014; Nelson 1998, 2012, 2014; Latham 2016), 
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LGBTQI+ issues have not been given the bioethical attention they 
require, most importantly due to the cis- and heteronormative bias in 
so-called mainstream bioethical contemplation. Unequivocally, this 
means a myriad of LGBTQI+ suffering has been ignored, forms of 
human flourishing violently suppressed, and beautiful lives tortured 
and lost (Sudenkaarne 2020a, 2). 
During the last decades, LGBT bioethics has been accompanied by a 
queer bioethics that combines queer theoretical understanding with 
bioethical analysis. Queer bioethics aims to increase the visibility of 
and find solutions to LGBTQI+-specific issues of gender and sexual 
diversity, but it also offers queer frameworks for bioethical theory and 
methodology. Lance Wahlert and Autumn Fiester (2014; Wahlert and 
Fiester 2012, 2–3) define queer bioethics as a field of bioethics 
focusing on questions related to LGBTQI+ people. Topics of queer 
bioethical interest can include, for example, ethical transition treatment 
for trans people, the bodily integrity of intersex babies, reproductive 
justice for same-sex couples, or queer hospice care. Moreover, 
however, Wahlert and Fiester (2014, 6; Wahlert and Fiester 2012; cf. 
Dean et al. 2016) crucially point out that while interest in LGBTQI+ 
health care aims to highlight important gaps and throw into relief 
serious LGBTQI+ issues, such work can inadvertently reinforce both 
the marginalization of sexual minorities and the cultural norms related 
to sexuality, gender identity, and the conventional family. To ensure 
that positive outcomes for LGBTQI+ patients are essentially paired 
with real ethical sustainability and decreased marginalization, Wahlert 
and Fiester advocate for queer bioethics as a methodology of 
scholastic, bioethical, and critical scrutiny. They set queer bioethics 
not only to address the needs of LGBTQI+ persons in a health care 
environment but also to consider the perspectives, histories, and 
feelings of such parties. Further, they see queer bioethics as a specific 
field of bioethics that targets both historical and contemporary 
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questions of sexuality and gender with a norm-critical approach. It 
identifies LGBTQI+ people as specific bioethical agents, which 
Wahlert and Fiester (2012, iii) also call the injection of queer 
personhood. Queer bioethics has two simultaneously operating prongs. 
On one hand, it focuses on LGBTQI+-specific questions, interrogating 
how and why gender and sexuality are produced and reproduced, and 
critically deconstructing them with the analytical tools of cis- and 
heteronormativity (cf. e.g. Sudenkaarne 2018b). On the other, it also 
interrogates why and explains how questions of gender and sexuality 
are questions of humanity per se and life as we (think we) know it. As 
recent scientific advances have broadened our understanding of, for 
example, the nonbinary number of chromosomes affecting gendered 
physiology, or how many so-called biological parents one can 
potentially have (cf. the three-parent baby technique), it can be argued 
that past-century sexual and reproductive ethics needs a “queer 
injection” simply to be able to compute contemporary bioethical 
debates (cf. also Björklund & Dahl 2020), as cis- and 
heteronormativity have ipso facto transmogrified our understanding of 
the human condition.  
Wahlert and Fiester (2012, iii–iv) define queer bioethical aims as 
placing sexuality and gender identity at the core of ethical 
discussions brought about by advances and renegotiations of 
normality in biology and medicine—placing the so-called less 
powerful center stage, challenging the status quo and presumptive 
legitimacy of the normative, and challenging LGBTQI+ 
complacency in the face of injustice and discrimination in medical 
encounters, systems, and policies.7 Finally, yet importantly, they 
 
7 The emergence of queer bioethics as a theory and methodology does not mean 
that these topics could not be challenged in so-called mainstream bioethics 
before its arrival (cf. Nelson 1998, 2012), or that no such work could be done 
without calling it queer bioethics (cf. Latham 2016). 
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define queer bioethics as serving as a moral theory, to which I will 
offer contributions in the last section.  
Lance Wahlert (2016) further describes queer bioethical 
methodology as an examination of the pressing ethical issues that lie 
at the intersection of gender identity, sexuality, and bioethics. At its 
core are bioethics-related challenges facing LGBTQI+ persons, 
questioning their encounters within the medical system. For him, an 
integral part of queer bioethical methodology is the appraisal of 
canonical bioethical concerns in light of queer perspectives. In 
queering bioethics, Wahlert wishes to introduce the traditional queer 
theoretical concept of queering or queer reading into ethics. This 
means the employment of methodologies from queer activism and 
theory to define ethical practices in medicine (ibid.). 
Wahlert (ibid.) sees queer bioethics as improving medical practice 
for LGBTQI+ people, or “the queer in the clinic” as he refers to the 
LGBTQI+ bioethical patient zero, in three different realms. In terms 
of clinical practice, queer bioethics ushers in an appreciation of 
queerness as central or valuable to a clinical situation, demands an 
acknowledgment of queer populations as worthy, and creates a 
greater tendency not to generalize or stigmatize. In clinical outreach, 
queer bioethics can shed light on the need for population-specific 
resources beyond the clinic, referring to e.g. social services for 
LGBTQI+ persons, which should be integrated into clinical practice. 
Continuity of care for LGBTQI+ persons must be guaranteed, thus 
replacing the attitude of suspicion with clinical comfort. Wahlert 
insists that queer bioethical analyses can enrich clinical training by 
offering ways to integrate queer patients and families into the 
canonical fold, with an ethical mindfulness of the complications of 
queerness in clinical encounters (ibid.). To achieve this clinical 
comfort and enhance queer understandings in bioethical thinking, 
Wahlert and Fiester (2014, 62) have formulated a methodological 
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tool they call the QBI, which also grounds my approach to queer 
vulnerabilities.  
Human sexuality and gender variance are processual, contingent 
fluxes in which individuals define and shape themselves. Queer 
thinking that critically addresses the complexities of normativity is 
needed to make changes, understand diversity, dismantle injustice, 
and enhance bioethical justice. Mainstream bioethics has not been 
successful enough in encompassing or resolving ethical issues in 
LGBTQI+ health care, in theory or practice. It has not adequately 
established queer agency or subverted the cis- and heteronormativity 
of practices. LGBTQI+ and queer bioethical inquiries were 
marginalized for decades (Murphy 2015; Nelson 1998, 2012). In the 
21st century, queer bioethical debate has been established as a 
consistent field of inquiry that is frequently present in mainstream 
journals such as Bioethics (Wahlert and Fiester 2012; Murphy 2015; 
Richie 2016; Leibetseder 2018). Even though this can be considered 
a breakthrough in its own right, it must be acknowledged that this 
current prominence was made possible by decades of systematic 
queer and LGBT thought and research with often marginal material 
resources—and the latter is still very true today (Sudenkaarne 2020a, 
2). To offer an example of the tension between queer feminist 
concerns and prominent bioethics, I would like to briefly discuss 
conscientious objection (CO) to establish how gender and sexual 
diversity renders queer people particularly vulnerable. 
In bioethical consensus, abortion is deemed a morally controversial 
issue and thus an issue of conscience for medical professionals in 
women’s and reproductive health. It is suggested, then, that the 
moral controversy over abortion is sufficiently managed by allowing 
medical professionals with such convictions to not participate in 
performing it, sometimes also extending to the duty to refer the 
woman to a professional who will do so (McLeod 2008, 2010; 
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Wicclair 2000, 2011). For me poignantly, there remains a lacuna in 
research literature that addresses CO with regard to this reproductive 
health issue from a principlist point of view. In my view, it is pivotal 
to look at queer feminist issues with a principlist framework not only 
within bioethics, but also on the legal and political level too.  
Gaining aggressive momentum globally, CO legislation has 
proliferated in the contemporary US, extending the legal rights of 
health care professionals to cite their personal religious or moral 
beliefs as a reason to opt out of performing specific procedures or 
caring for particular patients (Stahl and Ezekiel 2017, 1380; Gorman 
2017; Sanger-Katz 2019). The targeting of gender and sexual 
diversity with CO in biomedical ethics and care is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. State legislation in the US has for some time enabled 
counselors and therapists to refuse to treat LGBTQI+ patients. In 
May 2019, President Trump announced an expanded conscience rule 
to allow health care professionals not to participate in care to which 
they objected on moral grounds (Sanger-Katz 2019). Causing a 
plethora of bioethical issues, the rule also allowed health care 
providers to refuse basic care on “moral grounds,” allowing basic 
health care providers to withhold treatment on the basis of religious 
belief, even in cases of medical emergency. The rule was vacated in 
November 2019. It was described as a direct attack on the lives of 
women, LGBTQI+ people, and religious minorities, and as rooted in 
“animus against some of our most marginalized and vulnerable 
communities” (Bollinger 2019). 
CO legislation and bioethical justifications for it gravely reveal how 
queer feminist concerns require a framework that takes those 
concerns seriously. Even though CO can be harmful to several 
groups of people, and those people often suffer intersectional 
detriments, CO based on gender and sexual variance reveals that 
LGBTQI+ people continue to be exposed to vulnerability, and 
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moreover to specific vulnerabilities. Hence vulnerability becomes a 
dual concern for LGBTQI+ people and bioethics. On one hand, 
LGBTQI+ people can be refused health care based on a specific 
need, such as hormone therapy for a transgender person. On the other 
hand, LGBTQI+ people can fall prey to bias that threatens our very 
lives and well-being if we are refused basic health care.  
Although a more detailed account is required outside of this 
introduction, I suggest that a look at CO through the lens of queer 
vulnerability shows that cis- and heteronormativity can become 
weaponized (cf. Fiester 2015) to threaten basic human rights and 
allow exclusion from bioethical principles. Even though there 
hopefully is no effort to try to justify this type of CO within 
bioethical principlism, it goes to show that cis- and 
heteronormativity in bioethical practices, systems, and policies can 
infringe the flow of ethical sustainability. At its worst, this 
infringement becomes intense human suffering, causing the loss of 
queer lives, and establishing the need for LGBTQI+ bioethics 
pragmatically, clinically, and morally (Sudenkaarne 2020a, 4–5; 
Sudenkaarne 2018b). 
Similarly to feminist bioethical considerations, even though the 
current medical ethics governed by these principles seems to allow 
such moral harms for LGBTQI+ people and other marginalized 
groups, I suggest that the problem is not necessarily solved by 
seeking to remove those principles, but rather by seeking to 
consistently demonstrate how the evaluation of these principles is 
clouded by cis- and heteronormativity and to offer alternative theory 
and methodology for those evaluations. Before embarking on that, 
however, I must consider some tensions and critiques around 
feminist and queer positions. 
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3.3. Tensions between Feminist and Queer Approaches 
During the outset of the establishment of queer as an academic 
approach in the 1990s, Gayle S. Rubin (1994) infamously called for 
the division of inquiry between gender and sexuality. Following this 
philosophical and methodological distinction, feminist inquiry would 
focus on gender (“what one is”) while queer studies would focus on 
sexuality (“what one does”). However, the distinction was quickly 
rebutted by Judith Butler (1994, 1), one of the defining voices in 
postmodern feminism and queer theory, who condemned such an 
approach as “divisive, arbitrary and self-serving” and also as 
overlooking other issues found in both areas, specifically racism and 
social stratification. Even though there is very limited support for 
this type of strict division, there most certainly remain tensions 
between feminist and queer approaches. For my treatment it becomes 
crucial to find ways to utilize both approaches, as this seems highly 
justified in light of bioethics’ sketchy record of oppression and its 
urgent need to further tackle racism and social stratification in its 
theory. An expanded conversation would foster more robust thinking 
about gender and sexuality in relation to the ethical field as whole 
(Huffer 2013, 87; Mizielińska 2016). I will next discuss some of 
these tensions and offer comments to further my treatment.  
An influential approach to considering the relationship between 
feminist and queer thinking is to view them as historically entwined 
precisely through tensions (Purvis 2012; Richardson 2006). Feminist 
thinkers welcome queer views as also enriching dialogues within 
feminism, which has—as discussed in the first section on identity, 
essentialism, and relativism—always struggled with gender and 
sexual variance. For Richardson (2006) among others, the field of 
the postmodern is the most common ground for feminist and queer, 
particularly following Butler’s sociopolitical analyses of gender and 
sexuality. Yet paradoxically, it is precisely the work of such 
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postmodern feminists—who have promoted the notion of gender as 
immaterial, performative, and socially constructed, including e.g. the 
refusal of the sex/gender binary—which builds tensions not only 
between feminism and queer, but also between different feminist 
approaches. Those invested in women’s studies and lesbian studies 
reiterate the problem of relativism: how to continue the work of 
exposing and analyzing oppression based on gender and sexuality if 
they have no material bearing? This highlights the tension between 
feminism and queer as more political than theoretical (ibid.; Calhoun 
2007). Further exacerbating this tension is the division between gay 
studies, lesbian studies, and queer studies: the latter is sometimes 
considered to cover the two former, although both queer and gay 
studies may be insufficiently attuned to feminist concerns for lesbian 
comfort (ibid.; see also Richie 2016). One solution is to adopt a form 
of strategic essentialism suggested for example by Jagose (2009; 
Spivak 1988), meaning that the level of self-awareness of one’s 
gender and sexuality can vary depending on context. In my view, 
understanding this contextual variance via layers of vulnerability is 
more ethically salient than harking back to the problem of 
essentialism via identity politics. 
If perhaps the tension between feminist and queer as completely 
different areas of inquiry (the former allegedly into gender, and the 
latter into sexuality) has now been bridged, the myriad of approaches 
remains glaring: how to compare them, and how to understand their 
metaphysics? For example, for Jackson (2006), gender and sexuality 
are interrelated but also incompatible: for her, gender is a system that 
produces a fundamental social stratification, whereas sexuality is a 
form of social life. For her, neither is defined from the biological a 




In mapping out tensions, it is important to note how sexual desires, 
acts, and relations are categorized and gendered. An important result 
of the tensions between feminist and queer is the understanding that 
sexuality exceeds the binary of hetero/homo, that is, that all human 
sexuality would fall most importantly into that classification. 
Another crucial contribution, from lesbian feminism and philosophy, 
is the formulation of heterosexuality as not only a sexual preference 
but also a systemic, normative institution. The centrality of 
heterosexuality, and also the sexuality of heterosexuality per se, gets 
often reduced by institutionalization, and this continues to raise 
tensions in analyses of gender and sexuality.  
A feminist critique of the queer analysis of sexuality is that it implies 
that the feminist analysis of sexuality is inadequate (e.g. McLaughlin 
2006), as if it would be incapable of encompassing the variance of 
sexual desire. A feminist backlash against the playfulness of queer 
sexuality has questioned its applicability outside the elitist academic 
realm of the humanities and arts, which is at worst indifferent to the 
material struggles of everyday life. To the credit of queer 
approaches, they have increasingly expanded over the last decades, 
increasing the visibility of different communities within LGBTQI+, 
laudably taking up very unplayful topics such as queer remembrance 
(e.g. Alasuutari 2020), and discussing sexual diversity within 
normative approaches such as medical ethics (e.g. Roen 2016). Yet I 
concur that radically social constructivist queer approaches can 
become too distant from material realities. However, this can 
undoubtedly apply to feminist approaches too. Either way, even if 
some approaches are in danger of becoming materially unintelligible, 
this does not serve as proof that queer and feminist approaches 
should be categorically set apart or considered as juxtaposed; instead 
of polarizing them, McLaughlin (2006) urges, quite appropriately in 
my view, that queer and feminist energies are better spent joining 
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forces in mapping out the crucial forks in which gender, sexuality, 
and other positions become materialized and further, also ethically 
relevant.  
The critical tension between feminist and queer can be boiled down 
to their willingness to take on material injustices; according to the 
harshest critics of queer theory, playfulness, fluidity, and 
transgression for transgression’s sake have little analytical use 
outside of the academic sandbox, and can lead to ethical and political 
paralysis (Squires 1996). The spearhead of the queer critique of 
feminism, then, is that after feminism the concept of sexuality 
requires reinvigoration as a source of joy and not only a position of 
marginalization and oppression. Queer, lesbian, and transgender 
critiques have also pointed out trans- and homophobia in feminism 
(Stryker and Whittle 2006; Calhoun 2007; Elliot 2010; Pearce et al. 
2020). However, like all knowledge production, queer and feminist 
theories are also institutionally, politically, and socially situated; 
often the harshest positions are constructed in a cycle of debate 
(McLaughlin 2006). 
A bold solution that potentially bridges feminist and queer 
approaches has been suggested by Chrys Ingraham (2002): 
heterosexuality should replace the concept of gender in feminist 
approaches. Taking Jackson’s notion of institutionalized 
heterosexuality to the next level, Ingraham considers it to be the 
most essential for formulating ideological and organizational 
relationships between genders, and also to be the foundation of the 
social order. For her, then, gender becomes intelligible only via 
institutionalized heterosexuality, which is why she suggests 
replacing the term gender with heterogender. The centrality of 
heterosexuality being noted, I concur with critics that Ingraham fails 
to offer a reliable analysis of how the causal link between gender and 
institutionalized heterosexuality is established. This is why I prefer 
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Jackson’s notion of institutionalized heterosexuality, which 
resembles my bioethical notion of cis- and heteronormativity. 
Collapsing gender and sexuality into a single category would in my 
view be detrimental, as it fails to encompass the myriad differences 
between women and queer people; further, it leaves out the politics 
and exuberance of naming the ways in which sexuality relates to 
your life. 
A quite salient tension, a continuous ache in both queer and feminist 
theory’s side, is the role of lesbian input in their development. 
Within feminism, the position of the lesbian was rendered troubling 
by the “sex wars” of the 1970s and 1980s: the notions that sex with 
men is by definition a form of oppression and that the only true 
feminist position is to keep from having sex with men and live as a 
political lesbian despite one’s sexual preferences. In terms of queer, 
the position of the lesbian becomes antagonized by the playfulness of 
queer sexuality if that position is constructed against the backdrop of 
these feminist sex wars and as immune to real desire. This unfair 
positioning has been taken up by critics such as Linda Garber (2006; 
see also Calhoun 2007), who promotes the usefulness of feminist and 
lesbian approaches to the development of queer theory. One such 
development is to correct the unfair genealogy of lesbian feminism, 
which for her is first and foremost to be associated with the social 
constructivism of the 1960s and 1970s and divided between 
essentialist and existentialist orientations. The former considered 
themselves first and foremost as homosexual women, and thus 
identified with the gay movement rather than with the women’s 
movement. The latter stated that they chose to be lesbian. The 
essentialists saw homophobia as their biggest obstacle, whereas for 
the latter it was sexism (Wiegman 2004). This goes to show how 
lesbian contributions are crucial when one is tracing out the tensions 
between feminist and queer approaches. Further layers of tension are 
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added by transgender versus queer, and by so-called TERF (trans-
exclusionary radical feminist) approaches (Elliot 2010; Pearce et al. 
2020). 
To further inspect tensions between feminism and queer through the 
lesbian position, it has been argued that it was precisely lesbian 
women of color from working-class backgrounds that brought 
intersectionality into first-wave feminism, before its academic 
conception. These women also embodied queer, anti-essentialist 
identity politics early on, as they fought to make themselves visible 
as feminists, women, and lesbians (Garber 2006; Calhoun 2007; 
Lorde 2007).  
Despite the tensions, it can be suggested that from a historical, 
theoretical, moral, and political viewpoint, “queers need feminists 
and feminists need queers” (Huffer 2013, 9). There remain tensions 
between feminist and queer approaches, particularly when we focus 
on lesbian and transgender positions, but tensions can also tease out 
theoretical improvements and ethical struggles, and fill out lacunas 
of knowledge. Feminism and queer theory should not constitute a 
binary of its own (Huffer 2013; Mizielińska 2016). As established in 
discussions of differences within feminist approaches, “different 
realities do not mean we are enemies.” The “real enemies” are those 
who ignore oppression, happily benefit from it, or seek to increase it 
(Donchin and Purdy 1999, 5–6). 
3.4. Critical Responses to Queer Bioethics 
Some see queer bioethics primarily as too attentive to sexuality, 
gender identity, and the intersections between them, rather than as 
doing what Cristina Richie (2016) calls for: providing an alternate 
account of bioethics from a queer perspective. There are also cultural 
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and historical perspectives that can be used to interrogate and 
intersectionalize queer bioethical premises (cf. e.g. khanna 2007, 
2013). Doris Leibetseder (2018, 139) concurs that although 
compulsory reproduction and heterofuturity are key targets for queer 
bioethics, futurity and even a utopian vision are crucial for queer and 
trans people (and also people in general) of color, for whom the 
struggle to be able to survive is not a question of fulfilling one’s life 
plan. Instead, in Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) terms, it is a question of 
bare life in the face of forms of extreme oppression, including 
reproductive injustices. As reproduction is indeed a salient bioethical 
question, queer reproduction should further be discussed in relation 
to race, class, and citizenship with an intersectional approach.  
Another key critique suggested by queer scholars is to question the 
role of normativity in queer bioethics, as for some, queer scholarship 
is by definition nonnormative (cf. e.g. McLaughlin 2006; Jackson 
2006; Weigman 2004). However, in my view, as one of the central 
aims of queer bioethics is to improve existing medical ethics, it must 
be able to compute normative claims in order to achieve ethical 
relevance. I have suggested that we encompass this normativity by 
building on a queer feminist framework of principlism. Keeping in 
mind the critique that principles can mean a failure to fully recognize 
the fact that professional ethics and wider ethical values are 
inseparable, I wish to maintain that a reconfigured principlist account 
of bioethics could coincide with queer feminist bioethics, on two 
conditions. Firstly, there must be a framework for interrogations of 
cis- and heteronormativity in principlist analysis, as gender and 
sexual variance exposes LGBTQI+ people to specific vulnerabilities, 
for example questioning their autonomy in processes of 
infantilization (Wahlert and Fiester 2014; Sudenkaarne 2018b). 
Secondly, there should be a firm incorporation of data from 
stakeholders. That is, for example, trans people must be consulted to 
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establish the nonmaleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and 
justice of their care, in order to “make bioethics more ethical” 
(Nelson 1998, 2012, 2014; Honkasalo 2018, 2019; Latham 2016; 
Sudenkaarne 2020b). 
Against this historical and theoretical backdrop, it should become 
apparent that LGBTQI+ bioethics is not a rights-only position trying 
to justify minority claims. In Dow’s vocabulary, the queer context is 
not a euphemism for mitigating circumstances, but instead a way of 
attuning oneself to the contingent realities of LGBTQI+ people’s 
lives. Like Hoffmaster, I would like the ultimate goal of this 
endeavor to be an ethical account that is more attuned to the 
particular, and more sensitive to the personal—a bioethics that is 
more humane and more helpful. However, it must be noted that 
many LGBTQI+ bioethical theories, such as the queer bioethics of 
Wahlert and Fiester (2012, 2014) and its further developments, 
including and not limited to my own research, must be better attuned 
to intersectionalist critiques such as those introduced by Leibetseder, 
Blell (pers. comm., August 26, 2020), and Ray (2020), and must 
further consider crip8 (McRuer 2006; Stramondo 2016) interests. 
 
8 Crip refers to an approach that combines queer theory and disability studies, 
and which aims to challenge cis- and heteronormativity in connection to 
ableism—discrimination and social prejudice against people with disabilities 
based on the belief that typical abilities are superior (see e.g. McRuer 2006).  
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4. Further Feminist and Queer Bioethical 
Advances 
As established, a fundamental divider in bioethical theory is the 
approach to principlism, that is, whether bioethical evaluation should 
be based on principles, and if so, how these principles should be 
defined, justified, and applied. Further, however, I have suggested 
that cis- and heteronormativity in bioethical practices, systems, and 
policies may subject queer people to specific vulnerabilities, and that 
principles can become weaponized (Fiester 2015). When we enter 
the realms of gender and sexuality, it is common to encounter what 
Drescher (2010, 431) calls “morality tales”: binary gender beliefs 
and their associated moral underpinnings, which frequently play a 
role in theories about the causes and/or meanings of gender and 
sexual variance. Similarly to Lindemann’s narrative feminist ethics, 
Drescher suggests that when one recognizes the narrative forms of 
these theories, some of the respective moral judgments and beliefs 
embedded in them become clearer. To tackle their normative 
component, I have further suggested calling out cis- and 
heteronormativity as a necessary condition in ethical contemplation.  
To resolve the bias against gender and sexual variance, which is 
utterly moral by nature, this section offers the building blocks for 
feminist and queer bioethical reconfigurations of vulnerability, 
principlism, and moral theory. I draw specifically on the principlist 
approach of Beauchamp and Childress (2013). I focus on the 
principle of autonomy; taking on all four principles in detail is a task 
worthy of its own research project, which is indeed something I hope 
to embark on in my future work. For now, it suffices to consider 
reconfigurations of autonomy via queer agency as a layer of 
vulnerability and feminist relationality that further leads on to so-
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called posthumanist groundings for queer bioethics as a moral 
theory. 
4.1. Queer Vulnerabilities 
Queer vulnerabilities are my original analytical tool (Sudenkaarne 
2019), combining Florencia Luna’s (2009, 2018) layered concept of 
vulnerability with Wahlert and Fiester’s (2014, 56) QBI (see also 
Sudenkaarne 2018b). The current formulation consists of four layers 
of queer vulnerabilities, which I have named troubled kinship, 
interrogatory intimacy, queer agency, and ethical sustainability. I 
will then build on these contemplations, particularly queer agency, 
for further theoretical work on the principle of autonomy. 
When evaluating the layer of troubled kinship, the analysis can focus 
on asking whether the case in question honors the diversity of 
families and relationships across and within the LGBTQI+ 
population, or alternatively whether it prioritizes heterosexual 
marriage or the heteronormative family of origin. Does the case 
omit, exclude, or dismiss important characters—such as partners, 
lovers, or caregivers? To detect queer vulnerabilities of interrogatory 
intimacy, analysis can begin by asking if the case has implicitly or 
explicitly made value judgments about types of sexual relationships. 
Further, the scenario of the case may conflate “safe” or “safer” sex 
with monogamy or abstinence. The case can also function as a type 
of bioethical voyeurism, overly scrutinizing the sexual lifestyle 
choices of queer persons beyond their clinical or ethical relevance, as 
heteronormative discourses have a long history of an assumed 
entitlement, or even mandate, to scrutinize the intimate lives of queer 
persons. In these interrogations, queer people are encouraged into 
intimacy by the medical staff, but that intimacy is volatile, 
ambivalent—ipso facto, interrogatory (Sudenkaarne 2019, 2020b).  
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The layer of queer agency invites analysis of whether the case 
patronizes the LGBTQI+ individuals involved by pitying (or overly 
sentimentalizing) the queer subject. Vulnerabilities under this layer 
can be established by asking whether the queer roles of the 
LGBTQI+ people in the case are stereotypes or overgeneralizations. 
Has the case infantilized the queer parties? It is also important to 
note whether both queer and nonqueer subjects are treated as equally 
important and valid. Moreover, another crucial aspect of agency is 
the right to nondisclosure: it is important to reflect on whether the 
case respects the queer person’s choice and rationale to remain 
closeted or protective about queer health information. In terms of 
embodied agency and disability/crip interests, it is pivotal that non-
normative bodies are appreciated as legitimate, appropriate, and 
neutral. Queer agency is often misunderstood or not readable within 
the available epistemological paradigm, which defaults to pathology, 
resulting in problems of erasure and invisibility in clinical 
encounters, systems, and policies (Sudenkaarne 2019, 2020b). 
My fourth layer of queer vulnerability is the layer of ethical 
sustainability. Crucially, an analysis of this layer begs the question of 
whether there is a heteronormative value hierarchy in the case that is 
given priority over others. Does the case allow itself to be 
“dequeered” and still have ethical or clinical relevance? If not, does 
the queer nature of the case justify or disqualify it as worthy of 
legitimate study? Finally, a pivotal factor in establishing ethical 
sustainability is to decide whether or not unsympathetic and 
immaterial details about queer subjects have been included, resulting 
in bias against them. Although all of the four layers are to be used in 
evaluating ethical sustainability in the sense of just treatment, this 
layer offers particular insights for research and medical ethics. 
However, the notion of ethical sustainability exceeds traditional 
research ethics approaches. They often limit themselves to solely 
 
70 
dealing with issues of research conduct, although these are also 
important, as addressed by the third question under this layer. 
Moreover, I encourage the casting of a critical eye on how 
uninterruptedly ethical sense-making flows from queer subjects to 
nonqueer subjects—what does the method of queering or dequeering 
reveal not only about the medical-ethical relevance of the case, but 
also about how ethical evaluations of care practices and outcomes 
are informed by cis-, hetero-, and transnormativity (Sudenkaarne 
2019, 2020b)? 
Queer vulnerabilities are layered in the sense that they do not 
consider LGBTQI+ people to be similarly and categorically 
vulnerable; instead, queer people can be rendered vulnerable in 
various ways. With queer vulnerabilities, no single standard or ideal 
exists, and there are multiple factors of vulnerability, which are all 
deeply related to context and not essential properties of LGBTQI+ 
people. Queer vulnerabilities consist of dispositions: possibilities of 
being harmed, mistreated, or exploited, with varying probabilities. 
There can be many different situations that can trigger a layer of 
vulnerability. Luna suggests ranking layers so that the most harmful 
takes priority. It is crucial to note that this ranking, and the entire 
process of identifying and evaluating layers of vulnerabilities, 
requires an analysis that is ethical first and foremost. There are what 
Luna calls cascade layers that are most harmful, with the potential to 
exacerbate existing vulnerabilities or generate new vulnerabilities. 
Luna associates three kinds of obligations with the ranking of layers. 
The first obligation is to not worsen the person’s or group’s situation 
of vulnerability. The second obligation is that we should try to 
eliminate all layers of vulnerability. However, we can only demand 
this to a reasonable and possible extent. Thus, the third obligation is 
to find different strategies to minimize the layers (Luna 2018, 7–8; 
Sudenkaarne 2019, 2020b). It must also be noted that intersectional 
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analysis can highlight queer privileges within LGBTQI+—for 
example, how racialized transgender persons are rendered vulnerable 
in terms of reproductive justice differently than cis gay men, even 
though both remain subjected to queer vulnerabilities caused by cis- 
and heteronormativity (cf. Honkasalo 2018; Leibetseder 2018; 
Petersen 2015).  
4.2. Reconfiguring a Queer Feminist Framework for 
Principles: Autonomy 
Feminist and queer bioethical engagements with principlism in my 
view are needed not only to make bioethics more ethical, but also for 
the pragmatic reason that biomedical ethics is so engaged with it. 
Acknowledging this engagement and calling for feminist and queer 
bioethical contributions to principlism must not, however, exhaust the 
ethical imagination. Instead of trying to reject or promote the notion of 
common morality, and to reject or promote principlism per se based on 
that stance (and ipso facto thus falling prey to problems of identity, 
essentialism, and relativism), I suggest a four-tier model for queer and 
feminist bioethical contributions to improve principlism. The 
investigation of all four tiers must be ongoing. Ideally, a study, essay, 
or project should contribute to all four tiers, building on examination, 
investigation, interrogation, and imagination: 
1)  examination of principles currently used in biomedical ethics or 
in a certain case, including additional methodological tools 
derived from them  
– e.g. ethical rules, regulations, guidelines 
– how principles and rules relate 
2) investigation into principles’ definitions, instead of assumed 
definitions  
– e.g. via concept analysis, WRE  
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3) interrogation of their applicability for exclusion and 
marginalization  
– disclosure of ideological structures  
– e.g. is there inherent cis- and heteronormativity in the 
definition that makes it impossible for the principle to ipso 
facto apply in an LGBTQI+ case? 
– the investigation must be critically informed by 
ethnographic data involving stakeholders, as this is the only 
way to establish the effects of a principle, e.g. transgender 
people are stakeholders in the clinical ethics of gender 
variance  
4) ethical imagination: if ethical issues have emerged in tiers 1–3, 
an analysis is needed of what principles there should be, and 
how they should be defined and applied in order to make 
biomedical ethics more ethical  
– includes introducing new methodological tools to guide the 
application of principles, and reconfiguring their 
background philosophy (such as the QBI, cascading 
vulnerabilities, queer vulnerabilities, narrative feminist 
ethics, social determinants of racial disparities in health and 
health care) 
WRE can be methodologically used in queer feminist tier work, yet 
for me it does not suffice as a queer feminist framework, as certain 
norms are crucial in such work. If we are taking feminist and queer 
interventions in the social sciences and philosophy seriously, the 
framework or method has to be able to address what Mühlebach 
(2016, 877) calls the problem of ideology, that is, commitments that 
are manifest in social practices and at the same time undergird those 
practices. If ideology critique, such as cis- and heteronormativity 
versus gender and sexual variance, is to be possible within WRE, it 
has to allow for the uncovering of the problematic ideologies that 
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underlie the commitments, theories, and background theories we are 
working with, and it has to provide tools to counteract them. It also 
has to do justice to the fact that ideologies do not always come in the 
form of conscious beliefs, which Drescher (2015) noted as morality 
tales around gender and sexual variance. The disclosure of 
ideological structures is an inevitable step in entering the process of 
the mutual adjustment of commitments, theories, and background 
theories (Mühlebach 2016, 883). I suggest this is best guaranteed 
with a framework that acknowledges gender and sexual variance.  
To offer an example of queer feminist tier work on principlism, let us 
look at the principle of autonomy, or more precisely, respect for 
autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 101–102) use the 
concept to examine individuals’ decision-making in health care and 
research, as patients and as subjects, in a way that resembles 
stakeholder considerations. They make it clear that their principlism 
does not suggest respect for autonomy to be the most governing 
principle over others. Still, it has been suggested that autonomy has 
taken precedence in bioethical analysis (Holm 1995; Huxtable 2013; 
Lindemann 2007; Donchin 2001). Be that as it may, from a queer 
feminist viewpoint, autonomy remains a salient point of departure 
for moral reflection given its exclusive construction in the history of 
Western philosophy (Lloyd 1984; Code 2007; Anzaldúa 1999; 
Lugones 1994). What I suggest should follow is not that we abandon 
it, but that we build on a queer feminist framework. Beauchamp and 
Childress (2013), in my view accurately, state that in a properly 
structured theory, respect for autonomy is not excessively 
individualistic (neglecting the social nature of individuals and the 
impact of individuals’ choices and actions on others), not excessively 
focused on reason (neglecting the emotions), and not unduly 
legalistic (downplaying social practices and responsibilities), yet 
their delivery of such a theory is unsatisfactory. I will next discuss 
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why that is. Further, I suggest how feminist and queer bioethical 
reconfigurations could produce a principles approach that would be 
more successful in meeting these aims. 
Beauchamp and Childress (ibid., 101–103) define personal autonomy 
as encompassing, at a minimum, self-rule that is free both from 
controlling interference by others and from certain limitations, such 
as inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice. They 
observe that two conditions are generally accepted as essential for 
autonomy: liberty (defined as independence from controlling 
influences) and agency (defined as capacity for intentional action). 
However, as they (ibid.) duly note, disagreement exists over the 
meaning of these two conditions, and over whether additional 
conditions are required (cf. Huxtable 2013; Macklin 2003; Holm 
1995). In my view, much of the work on this focuses on the latter 
rather than formulating a cohesive theory of the former: the 
philosophical background theories, and the consequent standards 
they suggest for the evaluation of respect for autonomy, focus on the 
concepts of freedom, choice, consent, and refusal—the usual 
suspects in bioethics (Lindemann 2007; Tong 1996; Clouser & Gert 
1990; Donchin 2001). Although these are important and influential 
concepts in bioethics and clinical work, reiterating them from the 
background theories of Kant and Mill does not equal ethical 
reimagination. In my view, a reconsideration of autonomy in a more 
adequate framework could boost such a reimagination if attuned to 
some core norms, providing moral agents with a coherent, 
comprehensive procedure for ethical analysis (cf. Tong 1996, 69; 
Clouser & Gert 1990, 223; Donchin 2001, 366).  
Despite the refusal of moral-theoretical cohesion, however, there are 
also similarities within the moral systems informing principlist 
approaches (drawing beneficence from Mill, autonomy from Kant 
and Mill, justice from Rawls, and nonmaleficence from Gert), 
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namely, their understandings of individuality as asocial and abstract 
(Donchin 2001, 366; Tong 1996; Clouser & Gert 1990). By stressing 
the respect due to an autonomous agent rather than an ideal image of 
a fully autonomous self, and thanks to further particularities in their 
guideline standards for the evaluation of autonomy in competence 
and other classic bioethical settings, Beauchamp and Childress 
(2013) aim to curb this critique. However, as Donchin (2001, 366–
367) points out, this rejoinder disregards the main thrust of the 
critique: to apply the principle, providers must be able to understand 
what autonomy consists in and how they need to reorient their 
practice to respect it adequately. In order to reconfigure principles 
for queer and feminist bioethics, a defined moral framework is 
required.  
Like Donchin (ibid., 367), I am convinced that appeals to autonomy 
do capture values that merit a central place in bioethical theory, if 
autonomy can only be severed from the individualistic assumptions 
about social relations embedded in dominant moral theories. Crucial 
to the reformulation of autonomy is a positive conception of human 
agency that recognizes what Donchin calls relational experiences as 
an integral dimension of individuality. I add that it must include the 
norm of gender and sexual variance. The abstract universalist 
characterization of autonomy applies most plausibly to situations 
where the primary concern is how individuals fend off unwanted 
intrusions from others. Its focus is to provide rules to guide the 
exchange of information within decision-making scenarios. A key 
feminist critique here is that historical institutions and practices 
embody systemic patterns of dominance and subordination based on 
gender, race and ethnicity, and gender and sexual diversity. As 
established, it is these differences that are the most crucial for 
appreciating the distinctive feminist and queer contributions to 
bioethical theory (ibid., 368, 370). 
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For Donchin (ibid., 372), the power and authority of physicians to 
act as gatekeepers raises important issues about limitations to patient 
agency. As established, agency is one of the two conditions for 
autonomy shared by virtually all autonomy theories, and for 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 102) this is a quite limited view of 
capacity for intentional action, although they offer the dual definition 
of liberty as its other aspect. Based on revised bioethical 
understandings from people of color, women, and LGBTQI+ people, 
however, a more nuanced than dualist understanding of autonomy is 
needed, as their agency has been defined in biomedical contexts as 
marginalized and as also often overriding both their capacity for 
intentional action and their interdependence from controlling 
influence. Some examples include the long history of queer 
infantilization and the psychiatric diagnostics of gender and sexual 
variance (Wahlert and Fiester 2014; Sudenkaarne 2020b). 
Homosexuality has been removed from both the ICD and DSM 
diagnostic manuals, but gender variance persists within this 
framework, defined by incongruence and dysphoria.  
It is sometimes suggested that gender dysphoria (GD) should be 
compared to body dysmorphia (BD), which currently appears in the 
diagnostics as body dysmorphia disorder (BDD). Gender variance 
was also contextualized as a disorder in the previous versions of the 
DSM (Drescher 2015; Bray 2015; Sudenkaarne 2020b). BDD in 
DSM-V is currently defined as a preoccupation with one or more 
“perceived defects or flaws” in one’s physical appearance that are 
not observable or appear slight to others. The preoccupation involves 
repetitive observation of the perceived defect, and the preoccupation 
causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other areas of functioning. A GD diagnosis involves 
a difference between “one’s experienced/expressed gender” and 
“assigned gender,” often with a marked incongruence between one’s 
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“experienced/expressed gender” and “primary and/or secondary sex 
characteristics” (APA 2013). I am not able to offer a full account of 
this comparison here, and it should be noted that some transgender 
people find this comparison offensive (see e.g. Callahan 2014). Yet 
from the viewpoints of philosophical bioethics and a queer feminist 
framework, there are parallels to consider between GD and BD. 
There is widespread consensus in the philosophical and psychiatric 
communities that the supplementation of hormones as well as highly 
invasive gender reassignment surgeries are justified as medically 
necessary for treating some cases of GD. Much excellent work does 
exist on the motives for body modification in the context of GD, yet 
some justifications for GD, including its definition in DSM-V (and 
also in ICD-11), rely on gender-essentialist terms, a binary 
metaphysics of gender, a flawed division between gender as social 
and sex as material, and a transnormativity that makes only certain 
trans desires computable in the gatekeeping system (Bray 2015, 425; 
Nelson 1998, 2012; McKinnon 2018; Vipond 2015; Davy 2015; 
Dubov & Fraenkel 2018; Roen 2016). 
By comparison with GD, Bray (2015) accurately notes a lacuna in 
works of philosophy on BD, specifically when seeking to understand 
what drives the desperate need by some to modify their bodies in 
highly invasive, sometimes life-threatening ways based on perceived 
defects or flaws. I can concur with Bray (ibid., 425–426) that while 
hormonal and surgical interventions in the treatment of GD must 
continue to be considered medically necessary, the criteria for 
medically necessary body modification should not be fully reducible 
to questions of gender identity, or to a binary understanding of 
gender that creates transnormativity. A lack of criteria can harm 
many people in need of real help. The confused dichotomy between 
legitimately necessary modification and “merely cosmetic” 
modification that Bray (ibid.) detects between GD and BD actually 
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overlaps with current queer bioethical critique on differentiations 
between “primary and secondary sex characteristics,” as 
characteristics considered secondary in medicine, such as facial 
features, are often very primary in everyday life (Sudenkaarne 
2020b; Dubov & Fraenkel 2018).  
The parallels and asymmetries between GD and BD surely call for 
further attention from philosophical bioethics and from a queer 
feminist framework. However, a crucial difference between the two 
is the contextualization of decades of human rights activism around 
the former, which for the latter is perhaps yet to come. An 
investigation into parallels between GD and BD that would ignore 
the role of activism and gender and sexual variance embedded in 
human rights would be not only inaccurate but also offensive. Due to 
much excellent activism by the LGBTQI+ community and the work 
of many theorists, gender-dysphoric people in many countries can 
now have hormone supplementation and surgical procedures (Bray 
2015, 425; Davy 2015; McKinnon 2018; Drescher 2015). However, 
not all transgender people experience GD, and the availability of 
treatment does not exhaust the queer bioethics agenda. Criteria for 
body modification that are less attuned to gender and more attuned to 
autonomy should build on the appreciation of nonnormative bodies 
as legitimate, appropriate, and neutral, vindicating the claims of 
gender-fluid people and nonbinary transgender persons to access 
these technologies, and further leave intersex embodiment a priori 
unharmed by them. 
Despite advances driven by activism and scientific debate, medicine 
and psychiatry in particular continue to be essential in defining 
gender and sexual variance. For some critics, any criteria for 
conditions related to gender and sexual variance defined in the 
diagnostic systems of ICD or DSM continues to gatekeep access to 
transitioning technologies in transgender health care. Transgender 
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patients often have to perform and justify their claims via normative 
narratives (transnormativity) in order to “pass” as, for example, 
dysphoric enough to gain access to these technologies (McKinnon 
2018; Nelson 2012; Davy 2015; Latham 2016; Drescher 2015). 
There currently is not a theory of autonomy that would disown cis- 
and heteronormativity, build on gender and sexual variance as 
neutral, and promote what I have called queer agency to include both 
the capacity for intentional action and interdependence from 
controlling influence—to compute nonbinary queer and transgender 
desires, and defined on queer and transgender logics.  
For Donchin (2001, 373), what the standard theories and conceptions 
of autonomy initially miss is the fact that the actual patients who 
populate health care institutions seldom fit the standard norm, which 
is another reason why a more satisfactory conception or model of 
autonomy is needed. First, a serviceable model should draw together 
the different strands of a notion and exhibit their relation to one 
another. Donchin argues that the reigning concept of autonomy ipso 
facto does the opposite. Second, should theory and practice be in 
disequilibrium, a useful model would stimulate the imagination, 
suggesting further possibilities. Instead, for Donchin, the dominant 
model of the autonomous subject blocks alternative ways to 
reconcile theory and practice. Third, a useful model for autonomy 
should evoke a picture of interpersonal relationships that is worth 
striving for (ibid., 373–375). I suggest that queer agency could meet 
all three demands. First, it offers a more nuanced understanding of 
the liberty and agency parts of autonomy by offering the analytical 
tool of cis- and heteronormativity to tackle them in bioethics, and to 
be further scrutinized with the QBI. Second, it is essentially 
informed by practice drawn from LGBTQI+ issues that seeks to 
correct bias in theory and includes the call for ethical imagination 
outside binaries. Third, it evokes a multifaceted, radical kinship that 
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is grounded in relationality not only between humans, but also on an 
ecosystemic level and ultimately on a posthumanist level, a notion I 
will examine more thoroughly in the next section.  
Donchin’s (ibid., 378) relational conception of autonomy brings into 
prominence features of moral agency that liberal theorists have often 
relegated to the margins of moral life. Kantians particularly associate 
moral agency solely with a person’s rational nature, to the exclusion 
of the natural affections that in their account belong only to an 
individual’s biological nature. In their view, such affections have no 
moral value apart from an agent’s deliberative resolve to subordinate 
them to duty. Rather than idealizing a single model of the 
autonomous subject, Donchin (ibid.) calls for an alternative moral 
perspective that might draw on multiple models associated with 
different domains of human activity, including those that the 
prevailing account has relegated to a private sphere beyond the reach 
of moral assessment. For these aims, Donchin (ibid., 378–380) 
considers the models of friendship, mothering, and sistering. I concur 
with Donchin (ibid., 382) that despite the moral imagination 
embedded in such models, they cannot replace generalizable moral 
principles. I further concur with Donchin that despite the theoretical 
inputs of the feminist ethics of care, caring is too risky a metaphor to 
rely on to redress imbalances in power relationships. A further queer 
bioethical critique of caring is to note how bioethical analysis has 
computed caring relationships beyond cis- and heteronormativity 
(Wahlert and Fiester 2014), which is why the concept of queer 
kinship is needed. The ethics of care can also play into the problem 
of essentialism: there are views that consider caring to be a female 
virtue, paving the way for arguments that women are “naturally 
caring” and other essentialist claims that are used to reconstruct cis- 
and heteronormativity and unfair labor markets.  
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If we begin moral inquiry from the initial position of individuals as 
“situated social beings rather than presocial abstract individuals,” the 
moral significance of concrete relationships will not be left behind in 
the move toward a generalized perspective (Donchin 2001, 383). 
What is important for the practice of medicine is that moral inquiry 
be initiated from the concrete standpoint of the one needing attention 
rather than the standpoint of a generalized other, and that we 
recognize differences between self and other at the outset. We need a 
transformed understanding of beneficence and justice that recognizes 
the claims of those distanced from us by borders and boundaries. The 
advancement of moral goals often calls for collective action that 
extends beyond the particularity of personal relations. If we restrict 
our moral range to those to whom we can provide care directly, 
others are likely fall outside the realm of our moral consideration 
(ibid., 381–383).  
Alongside Donchin’s principlist reconfigurations, a further excellent 
example of reconfiguration work that utilizes the tiers of 
examination, investigation, interrogation, and imagination is Katrina 
Roen’s (2016) ethical considerations for gender-variant youth. Roen 
draws from feminist and queer background theory to offer concrete 
tools for clinical work. Her approach demonstrates once again how 
feminist and queer bioethics are crucial in healing bioethics. For 
Roen, feminist bioethicists have already offered an analysis of the 
place of the body in biomedical ethics and an analysis of the role 
biomedical science may have in the constitution of “sexed” bodies. 
Queer bioethics can “usefully go further” in critically mapping the 
(dis)ordering of sexualities and genders. Working from queer 
perspectives, Roen urges us to ask what effects are produced by cis- 
and heteronormative assumptions that permeate biomedical and 
psychomedical practice. She notes that one of the difficulties in 
developing queer bioethics relates to the assumption that control of 
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another’s body is just if based on consent, echoing Donchin’s 
critique of the definition of autonomy. Similarly to my suggestion, 
Roen urges that queer bioethics should employ the concept of new 
materialist (posthuman) embodiment: the body is not an object 
belonging to the self, but rather embodiment is understood as fluid, 
processual, and intertwined with the self in a lifelong embodied 
becoming (Braidotti 2003; Barad 2007, 135). A carefully articulated 
queer bioethics for Roen, including queer agency I might add, would 
ideally create new spaces for queered subjects, not just address issues 
of consent and control. These new spaces would not seek to define or 
diagnose, for example, gender-nonconforming youth or queer-
embodied youth, but rather would allow diverse futures to be 
imagined and facilitated (Roen 2016, 307). For Donchin (2001, 375), 
it is strikingly apparent that individuation is a fragile achievement 
that is always at risk of coming unraveled. She urges that we can 
learn much about fragility and vulnerability from those who once fit 
most closely with the prevailing conception of the autonomous 
subject but no longer do so. In addition to the psychological harms 
that may result from the identification of autonomy with 
noninterference, there are material dangers too, since the normal 
abstract conception of autonomy fosters moral indifference to the 
needs of others for whom one is not directly responsible (ibid.). I 
will next discuss how queer bioethics as a moral theory could take on 
such an expanded notion of responsibility and new materialist 
embodiment.  
4.3.  Configuring Queer Bioethics as a Posthumanist Moral 
Theory 
As Donchin’s work on reconfiguring the principle of autonomy 
demonstrated, principles involve deep philosophical investment. 
Looking at women, racialized people, and LGBTQI+ people in 
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bioethics—its so-called margins—can often raise central concerns. 
For this precise purpose, Wahlert and Fiester (2012) wish queer 
bioethics to be developed further as a moral theory. I suggest that the 
building of queer bioethics as a moral theory must not only aim to 
offer a fairer understanding of human life in all its gender and sexual 
variance, but must also try to tackle some of the most urgent ethical 
issues of our time, which revolve around ecojustice—the notion that 
human life that relies on conspicuous consumption exploits other 
species’ and ecologies’ chances to survive and flourish (Haraway 
2016, 102, 154, 157)—and reproductive justice, the human right to 
maintain personal bodily autonomy, have or not children, and parent 
the children we have in safe and sustainable communities 
(SisterSong 1997; Bailey 2011). This is what I refer to as a 
posthumanist framework (cf. Kirksey 2019; MacCormack 2009; 
Giffney and O’Rourke 2009; Barad 2007; Chiew 2014). 
Posthumanist contemplations overlap with classic questions in 
environmental philosophy, biocentrism, ecofeminism, and the One 
Health movement (see e.g. Wienhues 2017; Boetzkes & Robert 
2000; Shiva & Mies 2014; Warren 1997; Nash 1989). A common 
notion is that the quest for an inclusive health ethic has led to a 
critical examination of the conceptual constructions human/animal 
and human/nonhuman. It can be argued that the way humans have 
conceived of health must be revised, the denaturalized and 
decontextualized way we have understood ourselves as humans must 
be modified, and the prescriptions of ethics and prudence must be 
expanded, nuanced, and in some cases reconfigured. This 
observation reinforces what deep ecologists, biocentrists, and 
ecofeminists have long claimed: that progress in achieving “right 
relations” within ecosystems means scrutinizing inherited thought-
forms, resisting the dichotomization of humans and nature, rejecting 
domination, and proposing intersectional norms of ethical behavior 
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(Boetzkes & Robert 2000, 150). Although these overlaps invite 
further examination, my focus here is on posthumanism and a queer 
feminist bioethical framework.  
Posthumanism calls into question the apparently obvious coherence 
of human nature and aims to destabilize the basic premises of human 
exceptionalism or speciesism.9 It also calls for serious 
reconfigurations of the collective human self: the metaphysical limits 
and ethical ramifications of “us” and nonhuman others. According to 
this line of critique, human ways of knowing and being in the world 
do not have privilege or priority over the myriad of nonhuman 
entities. Significantly, the corollary of pursuing this perspective is to 
show that the identity of the human species is not unified or self-
present but thoroughly implicated in the phenomenology and 
ontology of other, nonhuman entities (Chiew 2014, 51−52; Barad 
2007, 134−141). It is crucial to note that it is precisely this 
ontological implication that renders us interdependent in terms of 
life. For McNeilly (2015, 152−155), this sociopolitical 
interdependency calls for a radical reapproach to life in human rights 
politics, especially with regard to women’s reproductive autonomy 
and abortion politics. Yet crucially, moving beyond the human 
condition is also an ontological shift, which Karen Barad (2007, 182, 
391−396) refers to as entangled responsibility or accountability of 
intra-action as part of the fabric of the world, and what Donna 
Haraway (2016, 11, 13) calls tentacular response-ability and 
becoming-with.10 The metaphysical shift also calls for 
 
9 I use these terms overlappingly, but they are not to be considered synonymous 
(see e.g. Warren 1997; Singer 2016).  
10 Even though she is almost always listed in its canon, Haraway herself ipso 
facto denounces the term posthumanism. However, she (2016, 32) is “nourished 
by much generative work done under that sign.” She (ibid., 101−102) prefers 
“humusities instead of humanities” and “compostist to Posthumanist,” as “we 
are all compost, not posthuman.” She (ibid.) sees humans as humus with 
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reformulations of kinship. For Haraway (ibid., 2), making kin as 
oddkin rather than, or at least in addition to, godkin and genealogical 
and biogenetic family troubles important matters, such as precisely 
to whom one is actually responsible. Learning how to intra-act 
responsibly within and as part of the world entails understanding that 
we are not the only active beings or the only morally significant 
beings. However, this is never a justification for deflecting 
responsibility onto other entities. The acknowledgment of nonhuman 
agency does not lessen human accountability; on the contrary, it 
means that accountability requires much more attentiveness to 
existing power asymmetries (Barad 2007, 218−219).  
Like Haraway among others, I believe that ecojustice does not 
require the eradication (which according to some would ipso facto be 
the extermination) of the human species, but it does require 
fundamental reconfigurations of our way of thinking about life and 
how we live our lives. For Haraway (2016, 31–33), the 
Chthulucene—deriving from the Greek word khthonios, meaning of 
the earth11—is a new story to replace the Anthropocene (see also 
Kirksey 2019) and the Capitalocene. It is a new imagination, era of 
response-ability, and narration of tentacularity, “meaning to feel and 
to try.” The Chthulucene is a sympoietic: it does not close on itself 
but collectively produces systems that do not have self-defined 
spatial or temporal boundaries; its systems are evolutionary, with the 
potential for surprising change. Haraway points out that the latter is 
 
potential if we can chop and shred the human as Homo, the detumescent project 
of the self-making and planet-destroying CEO. She (ibid., 13) insists that the 
category of companion species enables the refusal of human exceptionalism 
without invoking posthumanism, an argument I suggest would require further 
scrutiny.  
11 Haraway rejects any reference to H.P. Lovecraft’s ancient, monstrous, 




specifically important for thinking about rehabilitation (making 
livable again) and sustainability “amid the porous tissues and open 
edges of damaged but still ongoing living worlds.” Bounded or 
neoliberal individualism amended by the opposite of sympoiesis 
(autopoiesis) is not good enough, figuratively or scientifically; it 
misleads us down deadly paths. Instead, Haraway urges that humans 
should learn to die and grieve. For Haraway (ibid., 39), grief is a path 
to understanding entangled, shared living and dying: “human beings 
must grieve with, because we are in and of this fabric of undoing.”12  
For Haraway, the Chthulucene is the backdrop against which to try 
to answer the question of what happens when the best biologies of 
the 21st century cannot do their job with bounded individuals plus 
contexts, when organisms plus environments plus genes plus the 
currently unknown factors no longer sustain the overflowing richness 
of biological knowledges (if they ever did). What happens when 
human exceptionalism and the utilitarian individualism of classic 
political economy become unthinkable in the best sciences, across 
the disciplines and interdisciplines? Specifically, unlike either the 
Anthropocene or the Capitalocene, the Chthulucene is made up of 
ongoing multispecies stories and practices of becoming-with in times 
that remain at stake, precarious times, in which the world is not 
finished and the sky has not fallen—yet. We are at stake for each 
other, Haraway exclaims, the plural referring to all khthonios 
inhabiting the Chthulucene. Indeed, unlike in the dominant dramas of 
the Anthropocene or the Capitalocene, human beings are not the only 
important actors in the Chthulucene. The order is reknitted: human 
beings are with and of the earth, and the biotic and abiotic powers of 
the earth are the main story. Yet the doings of actual human beings 
matter. Both Capitalism and Anthropos invite odd apocalyptic panics 
 
12 On learning to die in the Anthropocene, see also the fierce, wise, and 
provocative pamphlet by Scranton (2015).  
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and even odder disengaged denunciations, rather than attentive 
practices of thought, love, rage, and care. Both the Anthropocene and 
the Capitalocene lend themselves too readily to cynicism, defeatism, 
and self-certain and self-fulfilling predictions such as the game-over 
discourse (Haraway 2016, 31; 55–57).  
Haraway’s Chthulucene, like all her elaborative and whimsical work, 
has inspired many feminist approaches. I concur that it reads as a 
powerful counterstory (cf. Lindemann 2007, 123), which is crucial 
for queer feminist reconfigurations. Yet in the midst of eloquent 
ideas, we must not lose focus on the intersectional material realities 
that are sometimes incompatible with complicated, embellished 
theorizations; we must formulate appropriate methodology to study 
those realities, and strive to eradicate or at least alleviate 
vulnerabilities related to those realities. A posthumanist queer 
feminist framework for bioethics, in my view, must be applicable. A 
posthumanist approach to bioethics might seem a bizarre if not 
indeed erroneous endeavor, as it could be argued that without 
anthropocentrism, bioethics will render its proper object—human 
life—unintelligible. I am not denying that human life, embodiment, 
and their related biopolitics would not be and should not remain 
central in various bioethical inquiries, but these inquiries should 
include posthumanist queer feminist formulations, without losing 
sight of the practical.  
To offer a posthumanist angle on thinking about reproductive justice, 
Haraway (2016, 6) notes that avoidance of the urgency of the almost 
incomprehensible increase in human numbers since the 1950s is akin 
to climate change denialism: both touch too closely on the marrow of 
one’s faith. Yet we desperately need to find ways to tackle both the 
false hope and the nihilist despair that fuel denialism. For Haraway, 
how to address the urgency is the question that must burn for what 
she calls staying with the trouble, making oddkin. If we stay with the 
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trouble, the tensions within reproductive justice must be 
acknowledged. For women of color, and also for many transgender 
people, reproductive justice is about access, not choice. A 
reproductive justice critique states that mainstream feminism has 
focused on keeping abortion legal as an individual choice, which is 
crucial but obviously not enough. Even when abortion is legal, many 
women of color cannot afford it. It is also important to note that 
reproductive justice is not just about abortion. Abortion access is 
critical, yet women of color and other marginalized women also 
“often have difficulty accessing contraception, comprehensive sex 
education, STI prevention and care, alternative birth options, 
adequate prenatal and pregnancy care, domestic violence assistance, 
adequate wages and so much more” (SisterSong 1997; see also 
Bailey 2011). These issues are further polarized by reproductive 
technologies that need human tissue and the global reproductive 
market (Bailey 2011). An important element of reproductive justice 
is its stratification. Stratification refers explicitly to power relations 
by which some categories of people are empowered to nurture and 
reproduce while others are disempowered, and to arrangements by 
which some reproductive futures are deemed less valuable than 
others. Ipso facto, women of color are more often encouraged to 
have abortions than to have children (Ginsburg & Rapp 1995, 3; 
Mamo & Alston-Stepnitz 2015, 522; Colen 1995).  
So what about intersectional feminist reproductive justice in a 
dangerously troubled multispecies world? Haraway urges the 
Chthulucene to evoke serious and lively stays with the trouble and 
makings of oddkin: that is, increasing human responsibility to 
marginalized lives and the other-than-human by refusing human 
exceptionalism through enhanced moral significance. Staying with 
the trouble requires making oddkin: understanding that we 
(posthumanly) require each other in unexpected collaborations and 
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combinations, “in hot compost piles” (Haraway 2016, 4). Further, 
Haraway (ibid., 57) urges that  
the unfinished Chthulucene must collect up the trash of the 
Anthropocene, the exterminism of the Capitalocene, and shipping 
and shedding and layering like a mad gardener, make a much 
hotter compost pile for still possible pasts, presents and futures. 
I suggest that bioethics is an excellent platform for inquiries that stay 
with the trouble and makings of oddkin, as animals, microbes, 
viruses, and other nonhumans have such a substantial role in 
medicine. In particular, the animal suffering involved in medical 
testing and experimentation remains unresolved and often discredited 
(Beauchamp et al. 2015). Nonhuman-human companionship is often 
mediated via human-built technology. These companionships are 
often considered subject-object relations with distinct categories 
between agents. Chiew (2014, 62−67) discusses Barad’s (2007, 
114−184) posthumanist performative approach to reexamining the 
representationalism and humanism that underpin conventional 
understandings of scientific knowledge, human agency, and ethical 
responsibility: a profound sense of systemic, metaphysical 
entanglement that she calls intra-active becoming. For Chiew, 
Barad’s notion of intra-activity makes a persuasive argument against 
human exceptionalism: to destabilize the self-certainty of humanism 
is to acknowledge that the human is an expression of the apparatus of 
life and world constantly taking measurement of itself, that we do 
not obtain knowledge by standing outside the world, and that we 
know because we are of the world. The point is not to deny or 
collapse the distinctions that are drawn between human and 
nonhuman animals. Rather, more provocatively, the perceived errors 
of humanism can also already be placed in life’s determination to 
understand itself, organize itself, and be present to itself, even in its 
missteps. How we make sense of our relations in the world—in fact, 
 
90 
how we are in the world—constitutes enduring questions about the 
nature of sociality, that is, the ontological inseparability of nature 
and humanity (Chiew 2014, 67). Allowing a posthumanist extension, 
this is also what I think Donchin called for with the relational 
understanding of autonomy.  
According to Kathryn McNeilly (2015, 141−142), following the 
traditional, liberal approach to life, mainstream debate on abortion in 
international human rights discourse has been shaped by a public 
health frame that promotes access to safe abortion to prevent 
maternal morbidity and mortality. She argues that feminist 
challenges to this frame have been largely unsuccessful in rendering 
a shift in this debate because they, like the wider public health frame 
they seek to challenge, also rely upon a claim about human rights 
that obscures the fragility and interdependence that characterize the 
human condition. Her new and in her own words radical approach 
builds on Judith Butler’s concept of livability—life as an 
interdependent, conditioned process, displacing the bounded, liberal 
subject. McNeilly urges that if we turn to the concerns of livability, 
an ontology that captures a more nuanced view of human life and the 
power that shapes it can be reached, allowing engagement in a more 
radical politics too. For her, this ontopolitical turn would disrupt the 
concepts of bounded individualism that limit what can be said and 
done using the discourse of rights, and holds the potential for rights 
to be used to facilitate “more radical encounters with life.” Her 
concept of the right to livability restages the relation between rights 
and life beyond what is currently possible with the traditional, liberal 
right to life and its associated discourse by seeking to enforce the 
egalitarian social obligations that exist toward (human) life, but also 
by challenging current distributions of livability and vulnerability. 
This in my view goes to further enhance the layered, queer approach. 
Even though McNeilly does not expand the right to livability outside 
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the human context, surely the shift in the ontology and politics of 
particularities to interdependency and “more radical encounters with 
life” can, if not indeed should, include nonhuman applications of the 
right to livability.  
A livability approach aims to open up the very question of 
belonging, of the social conditions through which life is produced 
and sustained, to critical interrogation. McNeilly insists that a more 
radical approach to life must involve embracing the social 
obligations attached to the conditions that sustain life. Engaging with 
the right to livability requires firstly the enforcement of the 
equalitarian obligations toward life. Secondly, a challenging of 
current conditions of livability and vulnerability as they emerge in 
sociopolitical contexts is required, which queer vulnerability also 
aims to do. The interdependency of persons that characterizes 
precarious life creates not only ethical obligations toward the other 
who is constitutive of the self, but social obligations too. The 
practice of the right to livability, then, firstly involves questioning, 
reclaiming, and enforcing some kind of egalitarian obligation to life 
that is currently inadequately fulfilled—not as something to which 
subjects have a right in the liberal sense, but in the sense of 
interdependent life where the life of the other is inherently caught up 
with one’s own and creates an ethical relation between the two (ibid., 
152−156). For Barad (2007, 396), this ethical relation has an 
ontological origin: a delicate tissue of ethicality runs through the 
marrow of being, and there is no getting away from ethics. Mattering 
becomes an integral part of the ontology of the world in its dynamic 
presencing. Responsibility is a matter of mattering, and it does not 
respect boundaries such as human/nonhuman. Barad (ibid., 158) asks 
what it would mean to take on that responsibility. What would it 
mean to deny one’s responsibility to the other once there is 
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recognition that one’s very embodiment is integrally entangled with 
the other?  
If we hold on to the belief that the world is made of individual 
entities, it is hard to see how even our best, most well-intentioned 
calculations for right action can avoid tearing holes in the delicate 
tissue structure of entanglements that the lifeblood of the world 
runs through. (Ibid., 396) 
In my view, to fully understand and respect the interrelation of 
vulnerability is to follow Barad’s ethical call: the very lifeblood of 
the world demands posthumanist morality. Precisely for the godkin 
of humans, our godlike environmental impact, and for the future of 
humanity too, we are obliged to balance ecojustice with reproductive 
justice. For McNeilly (2015, 152), her Butlerian livability approach 
aims to open up the very question of kin in the sense of belonging, 
the sociopolitical conditions through which life is produced and 
sustained, to critical interrogation. A political engagement based on 
the concept of livability should stimulate a differing 
conceptualization of life and foreground societal obligations toward 
the social-cultural conditions that encourage the flourishing of 
human life. As making kin is also about reproducing accountability, 
Haraway (2016, 103) urges us to make kin, not babies. To requote, 
making kin as oddkin, or introducing new forms of kinship, troubles 
important matters, such as to whom one is actually responsible (ibid., 
2). 
The demand for multispecies ecojustice stems from our ontological 
nature, which for Barad is entanglement. A posthumanly sustainable 
reproductive ethic would be to (re)produce oddkin—to surrender 
human exceptionalism without resulting in misanthropy, opening 
new avenues of responsibility to the nonhuman and more-than-
human—which is ultimately sustainable with ecojustice through 
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respectful interdependency. For Haraway (ibid., 103), this demand 
reverberates from making and ipso facto being kin: 
all earthlings are kin in the deepest sense, and it is past-time to 
practice better care of kinds-as-assemblages (…). All critters 
share a common “flesh” (…). Kin are unfamiliar (outside what 
we thought was family of genes), uncanny, haunting, active. 
I suggest that queer bioethics as a posthuman moral theory could 
make an original contribution to philosophy. Sharing insights with 
biocentric views on ethics and ecojustice, I see that queer bioethics 
as posthuman moral theory could respond to several critiques 
regarding queer, feminist, and posthumanist concerns in a 
concordant, grounding way. Such a contribution is original firstly in 
building on the norm of gender and sexual variance. Secondly, it 
aims to tie this norm to a sustainable, intersectional reproductive 
ethic. Thirdly, it disputes essential, hierarchical, and binary 
understandings of gender, human/nonhuman, technology, and 
kinship.  
If the 1990s argument about queer kinship highlighted how queer 
people who are rejected by their families of origin and by hostile 
societies create new forms of kinship, including chosen kin, and the 
early 2000s saw a queer rejection of reproductive futurism, it is clear 
that alongside growing legal inclusion and a growing range of 
assisted reproductive technologies, there is an increasing emphasis 
on normality (Björklund & Dahl 2020, 13). This suggests that 
queering kinship neither omits the importance of relations nor 
suggests an absence of boundaries around who is kin and who is not. 
If we become relatives and related through relationships as well as 
through technologies, a central question for queer bioethics is how 
commodification and vulnerability shape dreams and futurities (ibid., 
14). Kinship always conjures up temporalities: both the rewriting of 
the past and the imagining of futures. Going against multiple 
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impossibilities, queer kinship and agency are counterstories: 
reminders of how seemingly progressive frameworks continue to 
present trouble for so many queer families, and also of how families, 
parents, and children continue to thrive and survive against many 
odds (ibid., 14, 20). I suggest that queer kinship and agency as 
vulnerabilities, but also as revolutionary posthuman oddkin, could be 
laudably compatible with relationality and oddkin responsibility, 
paving the way for a posthumanist moral theory that is compatible 
with eco- and reproductive justice. 
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5.  Conclusion 
Among the articles in this dissertation, the first article initiated my 
queer feminist bioethical contemplation of the debate about the 
revisions to transsexuality in ICD-11, a globally central diagnostic 
guideline and a bioethical foundation (Sudenkaarne 2018a). It 
grounded the general philosophical framing of identity, essentialism, 
and relativism, further grounding the concept of intersectionality as 
crucial for queer and feminist bioethics, but also as complicated. In 
the second article, I applied the QBI, a specific queer methodology, 
together with feminist concept analysis to analyze common ethical 
guidelines concerning surrogacy treatment (Sudenkaarne 2018b). 
This analysis suggested to me the need for a queer feminist 
framework for basic bioethical concepts, including principles, as I 
noted that cis- and heteronormativity could confuse ethical analysis; 
crucially, this confusion is often unintentional, due to the 
embeddedness of this normative construction. Moreover, getting 
acquainted with bioethical research and clinical discussions of 
gender and sexual variance led me to consider vulnerability as a 
bioethical point of departure for contemplations of power, autonomy, 
harms, and risks, as of special interest to women, LGBTQI+ people, 
and racialized people, and further, as an intersectional category. For 
these reasons, in the third article I constructed a queer feminist 
framework for vulnerability as layered, grounding my original 
methodology to analyze some of these layers as queer vulnerabilities 
(Sudenkaarne 2019). To complete my inquiry, the fourth article 
revisited ICD-11 to offer a queer bioethical analysis of the newly 
reformed gender incongruence diagnostic, comparing it with GD in 
DSM-V, another highly influential diagnostic guideline. This 
analysis included the application of my queer vulnerabilities 
(Sudenkaarne 2020b).  
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I hope this dissertation serves to further engage philosophers with 
gender and sexual variance. Moreover, I hope my multidisciplinary 
approach highlights the importance of ethics that is attuned to 
dilemmas arising from the material realities of situated 
embodiment—from the worldings of the world, if you will—with the 
aim of fighting for a more just world for all earthlings. In terms of 
bioethical theory, in this dissertation I have offered three 
contributions to enrich it. Firstly, I have formulated an original queer 
feminist approach to vulnerability, including the concept and 
methodology of queer vulnerabilities. Secondly, I have formulated a 
queer feminist framework for bioethical principles and offered a 
reconfiguration of autonomy within it. Thirdly, I have offered 
suggestions for grounding queer bioethics as a posthuman moral 
theory. However, much more work lies ahead.  
The queer feminist posthuman approach to bioethics I have 
suggested can, in my view, vitally interrogate such bioethical classics 
as abortion debates, and further brings forth questions about human 
material realities meeting new material imaginaries. As we become 
relatives and related through relationships as well as through 
technologies (Björklund and Dahl 2020, 14), those technologies also 
shape embodied ethics. This underlines the recurring themes of 
feminist inquiry into reproduction: how it is controlled, and who gets 
to control it. Since technological advances such as in vitro 
fertilization, the realm of reproduction for those with good social and 
material resources has become increasingly technologized in the 
sense that it is thought that reproduction is like technology: precise, 
predictable, and fail-proof. Simultaneously, however, reproduction 
remains for others a brutally embodied affair: a haphazard calamity 
that can be life-threatening (ibid.). Precisely for these reasons, 
ectogenesis, a practice of creating human life without the human 
female and her womb, is both a feminist dream and a nightmare. My 
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first postdoctoral research project will discuss ectogenesis and 
womb-related technologies. To what extent are people with wombs 
obliged to be childbearers? If reproductive technology could offer 
some form of ectogenesis, would it be a liberating reproductive 
option? This has been a topic of feminist debate since the 1970s. If 
we take a step back from ectogenesis to existing technologies, the 
birth of a child after a uterus transplant from a living donor in 
Sweden in October 2013 spurred an investigation into whether uterus 
transplants would be a safer, effective, and more ethical solution than 
surrogacy. I argue that womb-related technologies including 
ectogenesis unearth serious concerns. I argue that there are grounds 
for specifically gendered concerns, as what makes ectogenesis so 
appealing to some is the promise of eliminating the cumbersome role 
of women’s reproductive work. I insist that not to consider 
ectogenesis a gender issue would be shortsighted, unjustified, and a 
source of grave moral harm, as many of the ethical issues concerning 
female reproductive work related to ectogenesis have not been 
sufficiently resolved with existing womb-related technologies. 
Womb-related technologies offer fascinating queer and feminist 
bioethical overlaps, as they question cis- and heteronormativity, 
technology, and biology in a very tangible manner. For example, 
womb transplantation for a transgender woman hoping for such a 
procedure is medically possible. Hence, the bioethics of womb-
related technologies offers an excellent forum for further feminist 
and queer bioethical advances, such as who provides the womb, on 
what grounds, and whether there is specific virtue in the reproductive 
work of the human female. However, it is crucial to bear in mind the 
constant intersectional tensions and vulnerabilities that are very 
material and embodied.  
It remains to be seen how my suggestion of queer bioethics as 
posthuman moral theory can respond to these challenges. As a 
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further challenge presented for the consideration of the academic 
community, queer vulnerabilities must be subjected to scrutiny via 
applied ethnographic work. Moreover, my queer feminist framework 
and queer bioethics as posthuman moral theory need to be better 
attuned to detect intersectional concerns. I hope to contribute in this 
regard with my second postdoctoral research project, which will 
focus on racialized queer sex workers struggling with antibiotic-
resistant syphilis.  
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V THE ORIGINAL ARTICLES 
In this part, I will briefly present the main findings of the four 
articles in my dissertation. I have had the pleasure of publishing in 
journals from various disciplines, which can be considered a 
hallmark of multidisciplinary work. In addition to the four 
dissertation articles, I have published three editorials for special 
issues and two articles on queer bioethics in Finnish.  
I  Considering Unicorns: Queer Bioethics and 
Intersectionality 
This article discussed queer bioethics as a critical stance for 
dismantling cis- and heteronormativity in bioethics, together with 
intersectionality as the investigation of and potential for social 
justice-oriented change. I contemplated the difficulties of navigating 
plurality with solidarity and ethical sobriety, which I named the 
problems of identity, essentialism, and relativism. I then proceeded 
to ponder how queer bioethics relates to intersectionality.  
I observed that certain intersectional approaches share key queer 
bioethical imperatives in exposing how seemingly neutral 
antidiscrimination discourses rely on bias and privilege. Both queer 
bioethics and intersectionality for me powerfully demonstrate that 
ostensibly objective methodologies are often inadequate to address 
socially sanctioned bias or unpack oppressive habits of mind. I 
discussed how intersectionality can interrupt narrative norms and 
disrupt easy binaries, such as male/female or homo/hetero. Because 
it is practice-oriented and has a social justice mission, I noted that 
intersectionality approaches analysis and advocacy as necessarily 
linked, which in my view corresponds with a queer bioethics arising 
from LGBTQI+ activism. However, grounding the queer feminist 
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framework, I established that intersectional queer bioethics required 
further investigation into cases of race and sexual and gender 
diversity with queer bioethics as the background moral theory, the 
formulation of which I suggested should be inspired by feminist 
metaphysical advances. 
This article appeared in the Society for Queer Studies in Finland’s 
Journal’s special issues on queer bioethics and biopolitics, edited by 
one of my supervisors, Lotta Kähkönen, and me. The special issue 
followed SQS’s seminar on lesbian, gay, and queer studies entitled 
Queer Healings, organized by Varpu Alasuutari and me. Queer 
Healings featured Lance Wahlert as one of the keynotes. Wahlert 
also contributed to the special issue of the journal.  
II  Queering Bioethics: A Queer Bioethics Inventory of 
Surrogacy 
This article applied a preliminary queer feminist framework and 
queer bioethics to an ethical guideline on surrogacy treatments in 
Finland, drafted by the national advisory board on social welfare and 
health care ethics. The surrogacy case was selected neither because it 
was the most queer-bioethically grave nor because it was rare. On 
the contrary: the guideline had nothing explicitly to do with 
LGBTQI+ people, and the consideration of surrogacy as a treatment 
is not uncommon globally.  
Subjecting a seemingly nonqueer, common bioethical practice to 
queer bioethical analysis revealed the need for queer bioethics: by 
offering a queer bioethical analysis of a general bioethical issue, 
rather than a specifically LGBTQI+ case, this article aimed to 
highlight how so-called mainstream bioethics can fail to 
acknowledge infringements of bioethical justice when it comes to 
gender and sexual variance. Hopefully making up in enthusiasm 
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what it lacked in diplomacy, the article established how hetero- and 
cisnormativity can cloud even professional bioethical analysis. 
This article originated in a paper I presented at the International 
Academy of Law and Mental Health (IALMH) world congress in 
Prague 2017, on its first-ever panel on LGBT and queer bioethics. My 
argument piqued the interest of Dennis Cooley, a distinguished 
member of IALMH and also one of the editors of its journal, Ethics, 
Medicine and Public Health. He encouraged me to write an article 
based on the presentation. In November 2020, the article appeared 
among the five most cited articles published in the journal since 2017.  
III  Queering Vulnerability: A Layered Bioethical 
Approach 
In this article, I took on the key bioethical concept of vulnerability 
from a queer point of view. I discussed how vulnerability is a 
specific interest for LGBTQI+ people. Framing these discussions 
through queer and feminist bioethics, I offered an original approach 
to vulnerability based on queer bioethics and a layered understanding 
of vulnerability. 
After considering queer bioethics and its (queer) critiques, I 
concluded that a layered understanding of vulnerability had strong 
potential for the analysis of LGBTQI+ vulnerabilities in bioethics. 
For further research, I formulated four layers of queer vulnerabilities 
to demonstrate some of that potential. I called them the layer of 
ethical sustainability, the layer of queer agency, the layer of 
interrogatory intimacy, and the layer of troubled kinship. I insisted 
that all layers should be critically evaluated and further developed 
with intersectional approaches. 
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The thinking process that resulted in queer vulnerabilities originated 
in my presentation at the conference How Does Vulnerability 
Matter? at the University of Helsinki in 2017. It was accompanied by 
a special issue of the Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society, 
to which I offered this article. I was delighted to contribute to 
philosophical contemplations within anthropology, and also to the 
queer feminist anthropology of vulnerability. This contextualization 
hopefully excuses the slightly clumsy title referring to a generic 
“bioethical” approach, which was to distinguish my approach from 
an anthropological treatment.  
IV  Queering Medicalized Gender Variance 
In this article, I considered ICD and DSM as foundations for the 
biomedical ethics of gender variance governing clinical practices, 
systems, and policies. 
I discussed the diagnostic details and bioethical ramifications of so-
called gender diagnoses in ICD and DSM. I then subjected 
medicalized gender variance to concept-analytical and queer 
bioethical scrutiny. I found both diagnostic systems to make sense of 
gender variance through incongruence, dysphoria, and desire in 
bioethically confusing ways. In my treatment, medicalized gender 
variance does not necessarily entail pathologization. I concluded that 
medicalized gender variance can be used to balance access to care 
and stigma. However, I also insisted that the evaluation of this 
balance should be more informed by queer bioethics.  
I further concluded that despite progress compared with previous 
versions of ICD and DSM, both were still in need of more queer 
bioethical scrutiny. This should include a thorough evaluation of 
queer vulnerabilities in gender diagnostics, which for me is currently 
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built on convoluted definitions of incongruence, desire, and 
dysphoria. I suggested that this convolutedness confuses the medical 
ethics of gender and sexual variance. Further, it could trigger moral 
harms, including cascading queer vulnerabilities. This article 
completed a cycle from the initial contemplations of an aspiring PhD 
candidate to a grounded, comparative ethical analysis.  
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Gender and sexual variance invite a cornucopia of philosophi-
cally salient inquiries. This dissertation considers them in the 
realm of bioethics. Bioethics can be dened as a eld of philoso-
phy that interrogates ethical, societal, and political questions 
emerging from the development of medicine and biosciences. I 
discuss how queer feminist interrogations of key bioethical 
concepts, such as autonomy and justice, can enrich bioethical 
theory, methodology, and practice.
